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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of 
selected state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither 
comprehensive in breadth, as several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues 
within individual cases are omitted. Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an 
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community to 
judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries are grouped by subject matter. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Alvarez v. State, Department of Administration 
In Alvarez v. State, Department of Administration,
1
 the supreme court held that driver’s-
license suspension hearings are not subject to speedy-trial limitations.
2
 In September of 
2003, Alvarez was pulled over and failed a breath test.
3
 Her license suspension hearing 
was delayed until April of 2006.
4
 The supreme court reasoned that, because a license 
suspension hearing is not a criminal proceeding, the policy reasons for speedy-trial 
limitations do not apply; thus, the delay did not violate Alvarez’s right to a speedy trial.5 
Affirming, the supreme court held that driver’s-license suspension hearings are not 
subject to speedy trial limitations.
6
 
 
Monzulla v. Vorhees Concrete Cutting 
In Monzulla v. Vorhees Concrete Cutting,
7
 the supreme court held that: (1) the Alaska 
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission has implied subject matter jurisdiction to 
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review interlocutory orders of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board before a final 
Board decision and (2) the Commission’s power to issue stays is not confined to 
compensation orders.
8
 Monzulla appealed a grant of venue change by the Commission, 
arguing that the legislature had not provided the Commission with authority to review 
non-final Board decisions.
9
 Vorhees contended that the legislature specifically granted 
jurisdiction to the Commission to review interlocutory orders.
10
 After examining 
legislative history, persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions, and practical 
considerations,
11
 the supreme court affirmed and held that (1) the Alaska Workers’ 
Compensation Appeals Commission has implied subject matter jurisdiction to review 
interlocutory orders of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board before a final Board 
decision and (2) the Commission’s power to issue stays is not confined to compensation 
orders.
12
 
 
Alaska Exchange Carriers Ass’n, Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska 
In Alaska Exchange Carriers Ass’n, Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska,13 the 
supreme court held that the general prohibition against retroactive ratemaking does not 
fully apply to procedural mistakes and that such mistakes may be retroactively corrected 
on a case-by-case basis.
14
 After the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA) closed its 
2007 Access Charge Proceedings, the Alaska Exchange Carriers Association (AECA) 
discovered an error in the rates it had submitted.
15
 AECA requested retroactive 
application of the corrected rates, but RCA denied the request because of the general 
prohibition against retroactive ratemaking.
16
 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed that 
there is a general prohibition against retroactive ratemaking.
17
 But the court reasoned that 
there might be a sound justification for retroactive ratemaking in procedural mistake 
cases and that each such case should be evaluated individually by the RCA.
18
 The court 
thus recognized the correction of procedural mistakes as distinct from retroactive 
ratemaking.
19
 Reversing, the supreme court held that the general prohibition against 
retroactive ratemaking does not fully apply to procedural mistakes and that such mistakes 
may be retroactively corrected on a case-by-case basis.
20
 
 
Shea v. State, Department of Administration 
In Shea v. State, Department of Administration,
21
 the supreme court held that, with regard 
to occupational disability benefits, an applicant must prove only that an occupational 
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injury was “a” (not “the”) substantial factor leading to the disability.22 An administrative 
law judge determined that Shea’s prolonged sitting at work was one among many factors 
contributing to her disability, not the substantial factor that caused her disability.
23
 
Because, by statute, Shea was required to prove that her occupational injury was a 
“substantial factor” in her disability, she was denied occupational disability benefits.24 
The superior court affirmed.
25
 On appeal, Shea argued that AS 39.35.680(27), requiring 
that an occupational injury be a “substantial factor” in the disability, does not require the 
occupational injury to be “the” substantial factor leading to the disability.26 The supreme 
court reasoned that, with respect to torts and to workers’ compensation claims, it had 
previously held that “substantial factor” meant only “a” substantial factor or legal cause 
of injury, not “the” substantial factor or legal cause.27 Importing this same analysis into 
the occupational disability arena, the court noted that, although an applicant need only 
show that the worker’s injury was “a” substantial factor, the applicant must also show 
that the disability was actually and proximately caused by the injury.
28
 Reversing, the 
supreme court held that, with regard to occupational disability benefits, an applicant must 
prove only that an occupational injury was “a” (not “the”) substantial factor leading to the 
disability.
29
 
 
Widmyer v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 
In Widmyer v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,
30
 the supreme court held 
that the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) does not abuse its discretion by 
refusing to consider new evidence in a petition for reconsideration when the petitioner 
has had numerous opportunities to present evidence.
31
 To gain entry to certain fisheries, 
applicants were required by the CFEC to present evidence that they had in years past 
obtained a requisite amount of fish from those fisheries; alternatively, documented 
extraordinary circumstances preventing them from obtaining the requisite amount of fish 
could suffice to obtain a permit.
32
 Widmyer applied for entry, claiming that extraordinary 
circumstances had prevented him from obtaining the requisite amount of fish ordinarily 
required for entry.
33
 The CFEC denied his application.
34
 Twenty years later, Widmyer 
petitioned for reconsideration, attaching new affidavits and other new evidence to his 
petition, but the CFEC refused to allow any additions to his record.
35
 On appeal, 
Widmyer argued that the CFEC had abused its discretion by refusing to consider new 
evidence in his petition for reconsideration.
36
 The supreme court noted that the CFEC had 
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been given the power to regulate its own procedures and that nothing in the Limited 
Entry Act requires the CFEC to consider new evidence (or prevents it from doing so).
37
 
The court further noted that Widmyer had had over 20 years to collect and present 
evidence and that he had been afforded numerous opportunities to present evidence.
38
 
The supreme court therefore affirmed, holding that the CFEC does not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to consider new evidence in a petition for reconsideration when the 
petitioner has had numerous opportunities to present evidence.
39
 
 
J.P. v. Anchorage School District 
In J.P. v. Anchorage School District,
40
 the supreme court held that a school district’s 
delay in evaluating a student for special education services does not render the district 
responsible for the costs of that student’s elective private tutoring.41 The parents of an 
elementary school student became concerned about their son’s reading skills and 
requested that the school evaluate him for special education services.
42
 When the school 
district failed to act, they reiterated their request and asked for a hearing under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
43
 They then had an evaluation 
conducted by a private practitioner and sought tutoring for their son.
44
 A hearing officer 
agreed with the school district that the child was ineligible for special education services, 
but the officer required the school district to reimburse his parents for half the cost of his 
tutoring.
45
 The superior court held that the school district was not responsible for the 
costs of tutoring since the child had been found to be ineligible for tutoring services 
under IDEA.
46
 On appeal, the parents argued that the school district’s delay in conducting 
an evaluation should permit them to seek reimbursement for the tutoring service.
47
 The 
supreme court disagreed with the parents, reasoning that procedural violations under 
IDEA should not render a school district responsible for services it would not have been 
required to provide.
48
 Affirming, the supreme court held that a school district’s delay in 
evaluating a student for special education services does not render the district responsible 
for the costs of that student’s elective private tutoring.49 
 
Alaskan Crude Corp. v. State, Department of Natural Resources 
In Alaskan Crude Corp. v. State, Department of Natural Resources,
50
 the supreme court 
held that a pending appeal does not constitute a “force majeure” for the purposes of 
releasing a unit operator from the terms of a unit agreement for oil and gas exploration if 
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the unit operator was aware of the appeal at the time the unit agreement was made.
51
 
Alaskan Crude operated an oil and gas well.
52
 It had formed a unit agreement with the 
State Department of Natural Resources (DNR) setting forth deadlines for certain work 
obligations and providing that the violation of those deadlines would constitute a default 
of the agreement.
53
 Alaskan Crude received notice that the Alaska Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (AOGCC) had designated the well gas only; Alaskan Crude 
modified the deadlines in its unit agreement while simultaneously appealing AOGCC’s 
decision.
54
 When Alaskan Crude failed to meet the modified deadlines, it argued that the 
pending appeal of AOGCC’s decision was a “force majeure” which, under the terms of 
the unit agreement, released it from the obligation of meeting the deadlines.
55
 The trial 
court held that the pending appeal was not a “force majeure.”56 The supreme court 
agreed, noting that Alaskan Crude had notice of AOGCC’s decision and the pending 
appeal at the time that its unit agreement was modified; therefore, the appeal was not 
beyond Alaskan Crude’s ability to foresee or control (as required by DNR’s definition of 
“force majeure”).57 Affirming, the supreme court held that a pending appeal does not 
constitute a “force majeure” for the purposes of releasing a unit operator from the terms 
of a unit agreement for oil and gas exploration if the unit operator was aware of the 
appeal at the time the unit agreement was modified.
58
 
 
Lewis-Walunga v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Lewis-Walunga v. Municipality of Anchorage,
59
 the supreme court held that a 
“successful party” in an appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission is a 
party that prevails on a significant issue in the appeal.
60
 Lewis-Walunga won a workers’ 
compensation claim and was awarded attorneys’ fees, but the Workers’ Compensation 
Board awarded 30 percent less in attorneys’ fees than Lewis-Walunga had requested.61 
She appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, and, although the 
Commission did not agree with all of her points of appeal, it did agree to vacate the 
award and remanded to the Board for a factual finding that would justify the reduced 
award.
62
 When Lewis-Walunga moved for attorneys’ fees for the appeal, the Commission 
held that she had not been the “successful party” on appeal because she had not received 
an award of full attorneys’ fees.63 On appeal from the Commission’s decision, the 
supreme court determined that the attorneys’ fees award provision in AS 23.30.008(d) 
(which governs awards for Commission appeals) should be construed similarly to 
Appellate Rule 508(g)(2), which contains similar language.
64
 The court determined that a 
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“successful party” in a Commission appeal is a party that prevails on a significant issue in 
the appeal.
65
 Because one of the remedies requested by Lewis-Walunga from the 
Commission was a remand for additional fact-finding, Lewis-Walunga was a “successful 
party” under the attorneys’ fees provision.66 Reversing, the supreme court held that a 
“successful party” in an appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission is a 
party that prevails on a significant issue in the appeal.
67
 
 
Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Department of Natural Resources 
In Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Department of Natural Resources,
68
 the supreme court held 
that it will defer to agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute when the agency’s 
interpretation is long-standing.
69
 By statute, royalties from natural gas production on land 
leased from the State can be calculated in two ways:  “higher of” pricing or contract 
pricing.
70
  “Higher of” pricing is the default.71 Marathon had been paying royalties under 
the default option for five years; it then requested that the State apply contract pricing 
retroactively to its royalty calculations for the previous five years.
72
 The Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) refused, determining that the applicable statute,                     
AS 38.05.180(aa), does not authorize DNR to grant retroactive approval of a change in 
the method of royalty calculation; DNR determined that it could only approve a change in 
method for future production.
73
 On appeal, Marathon argued that the statute does give 
DNR the authority to grant retroactive approval for past production.
74
 The supreme court 
first determined that the statute is ambiguous and that the legislative history did not 
resolve the ambiguity.
75
 But the court noted that DNR had interpreted the ambiguous 
statute, for at least ten years, to prevent retroactive approval of the kind that Marathon 
requested.
76
 Because the interpretation was long-standing, the court deferred to DNR’s 
interpretation.
77
 Affirming, the supreme court held that it will defer to agency 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute when the agency’s interpretation is long-
standing.
78
 
 
Rivera v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
In Rivera v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
79
 the supreme court held that the state’s Workers’ 
Compensation Board does not err in denying a claim when it assigns greater weight to the 
testimony of one of several medical experts.
80
 Rivera injured her back on two occasions 
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while employed by Wal-Mart and she was paid workers’ compensation benefits.81 The 
store filed a controversion after its doctor examined Rivera and concluded that her 
ongoing back pain was caused by an underlying degenerative condition and not by the 
injuries she had received in the course of her employment.
82
 Rivera filed for temporary 
total disability benefits, citing the opinion of several other doctors that the injuries had 
exacerbated her degenerative condition and were the cause of her back pain.
83
 The 
Workers’ Compensation Board denied her claim for benefits based on the testimony of 
Wal-Mart’s doctor, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the 
Board’s decision.84 On appeal, the supreme court cited existing case law suggesting that 
the Board can assign unequal credence to conflicting testimony of medical experts in 
reaching its decision so long as it weighs all testimony and identifies which opinion it 
considers more persuasive.
85
The supreme court affirmed, holding that the Workers’ 
Compensation Board does not err in denying a claim when it assigns greater weight to the 
testimony of one of several medical experts.
86
 
 
State, Department of Corrections v. Hendricks-Pearce 
In State, Department of Corrections v. Hendricks-Pearce,
87
 the supreme court held that, 
under AS 33.30.028, a former prisoner can be liable to the State for the cost of medical 
care that he received while he was a prisoner.
88
 While incarcerated, Pearce received 
medical care at the State’s expense.89 He obtained a medical malpractice award for the 
care that he had received and the Department of Corrections (DOC) withheld from that 
award the amount that it claimed the DOC had spent on his medical care.
90
 In a 
declaratory judgment action filed by DOC after Pearce had been released, the superior 
court granted Pearce’s motion for summary judgment, holding that AS 33.30.028, which 
states that medical care costs are the responsibility of the prisoner, does not apply to 
former prisoners.
91
 On appeal, the supreme court noted that, although the statute is 
applicable to “prisoner[s],” statutes often identify parties based on a prior status.92 The 
court also noted that applying the statute to former prisoners would further the 
legislature’s goal of curbing prison costs.93 Finally, the court reasoned that a narrower 
interpretation would lead to anomalous results because it would condition the State’s 
right to reimbursement on the timing of medical care.
94
 Reversing, the supreme court 
held that, under AS 33.30.028, a former prisoner can be liable to the State for the cost of 
medical care that he received while he was a prisoner.
95
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James v. State, Department of Corrections 
In James v. State, Department of Corrections,
96
 the supreme court held that                   
(1) disciplinary proceedings for alleged “low-moderate” infractions by a prisoner can, 
when the charges are serious enough and when the punishment is severe enough, 
constitute a “major disciplinary proceeding” entitling the inmate to due process rights 
(including the right to produce documentary evidence, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, and the right to have the disciplinary hearing recorded);
97
 and (2) the 
24-hour written-notice requirement, which applies when the inmate desires to call 
witnesses at the disciplinary hearing, does not apply to a request for the presence of the 
inmate’s accusers.98 The superior court upheld James’ disciplinary adjudication, which 
had resulted in a punishment of 20 days of solitary confinement, because James had not 
given written notice in advance of the disciplinary hearing that he desired to confront his 
accuser.
99
 James appealed the decision, arguing that his due process rights had been 
violated because the adjudication was entirely based on hearsay information and because 
the hearing had not been audio recorded.
100
 After examining court precedent and state 
regulations,
101
 the supreme court reversed.
102
 It held that (1) disciplinary proceedings for 
alleged “low-moderate” infractions by a prisoner can, when the charges are serious 
enough and when the punishment is severe enough, constitute a “major disciplinary 
proceeding” entitling the inmate to expanded due process rights (including the right to 
produce documentary evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and 
the right to have the disciplinary hearing recorded);
103
 and (2) the 24-hour written-notice 
requirement, which applies when the inmate desires to call witnesses at the disciplinary 
hearing, does not apply to a request for the presence of the inmate’s accusers.104 
 
BUSINESS LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp. 
In Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp.,
105
 the supreme court held that the business 
judgment rule does not necessitate finding that a corporate director acted with gross 
negligence before imposing liability on the director.
106
 A jury found Henrichs liable for 
breaching his fiduciary duty to Chugach Alaska Corporation under an ordinary 
negligence standard of care.
107
 Separately, the superior court determined that Henrichs 
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had abused his authority.
108
 On appeal, Henrichs argued that the business judgment rule 
protects directors from liability unless their conduct is determined to be grossly negligent 
and that, therefore, the superior court had erred by instructing the jury that he could be 
liable for breaching his fiduciary duties under an ordinary negligence standard of care.
109
 
The supreme court noted that, although the common law business judgment rule protects 
corporate directors from liability absent a showing of bad faith, a breach of fiduciary 
duty, or an act contrary to public policy, the court had never adopted a “gross negligence” 
standard and refused to do so for Henrichs.
110
  The court reasoned that because the jury 
had found that Henrichs breached his fiduciary duty, and because the superior court had 
found that Henrichs had abused his authority, the business judgment rule did not protect 
Henrichs from liability.
111
 Affirming, the supreme court held that the business judgment 
rule does not necessitate finding that a corporate director acted with gross negligence 
before imposing liability on the director.
112
 
 
Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp. 
In Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp.,
113
 the supreme court held that a corporation does 
not have an affirmative duty to deliver books, records, or documents to shareholders or 
directors.
114
  Three former directors of Chugach Alaska Corporation each sought 
reelection to the corporation’s board of directors.115  They requested a list of shareholder 
addresses and the number of shares owned by each shareholder.
116
 Chugach sent the 
former directors an email containing that information, but did not send it as quickly as the 
directors wanted.
117
 The former directors sued the corporation, claiming that the 
corporation had a duty to deliver the requested information to them.
118
 The superior court 
granted summary judgment to the corporation because the former directors had not 
sought to inspect the shareholder list at the corporation’s registered office or principal 
place of business.
119
 On appeal, the supreme court determined that state law provides 
directors the right to inspect and copy books, records, and documents, but it does not 
provide directors with the right to have books, records, or documents personally delivered 
to them.
120
  Affirming, the supreme court held that a corporation does not have an 
affirmative duty to deliver books, records, or documents to shareholders or directors.
121
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Roberson v. Southwood Manor Associates, LLC 
In Roberson v. Southwood Manor Associates, LLC,
122
 the supreme court held that 
Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA) does not apply to 
real property transactions.
123
 Southwood Manor owned a trailer park in Anchorage, 
where Roberson rented space.
124
 When Roberson was late with rent payments, 
Southwood sued, seeking late charges.
125
 Roberson filed a counterclaim, arguing that the 
late charges violated the UTPA.
126
 The superior court held that the UTPA did not apply 
to residential leases.
127
 On appeal, the supreme court noted that, although the UTPA’s list 
of unfair trade practices is not exhaustive, disputes between landlords and tenants were 
not listed in the UTPA, and the court further noted that it had never previously held that 
the UTPA applied to transactions involving real property.
128
 Affirming, the supreme 
court held that the UTPA does not apply to real property transactions.
129
 
 
ASRC Energy Services Power & Communications, LLC v. Golden Valley Electric 
 Ass’n, Inc. 
In ASRC Energy Services Power & Communications, LLC v. Golden Valley Electric 
Ass’n, Inc.,130 the supreme court held that the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Act’s (UTPA) directive that, when interpreting the UTPA, courts 
give due consideration and great weight to the FTC Act and its interpretations, does not 
require a court to abandon Alaskan precedent when the FTC Act later changes.
131
 Golden 
awarded ASRC two construction bids.
132
 A contract dispute arose due to ASRC’s 
requesting additional compensation.
133
 During the trial, both parties amended their 
pleadings and answers to include UTPA claims and counterclaims.
134
 The UTPA directs 
courts to give due consideration and great weight to the FTC Act and its interpretations 
when interpreting the UTPA.
135
 The supreme court relied on the FTC Act interpretations 
when defining the UTPA’s standards.136 Congress later amended the FTC Act, including 
the portions that the supreme court had previously relied upon to determine the scope of 
the UTPA.
137
 On appeal, ASRC claimed that using the previous Alaska standard would 
violate the UTPA’s directive to give due consideration and great weight to the FTC Act 
and its interpretations.
138
 The supreme court reasoned that the state legislature that had 
passed the UTPA had referred to the FTC Act that existed at that time, and that the 
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legislature had not intended that the courts would abandon state precedent if the federal 
law later changed.
139
 The supreme court held that the UTPA directive that, when 
interpreting the UTPA, courts give due consideration and great weight to the FTC Act 
and its interpretations, does not require a court to abandon Alaskan precedent when the 
FTC Act later changes.
140
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Miller v. Handle Construction Co. 
In Miller v. Handle Construction Co.,
141
 the supreme court held that the offeror in a   
Rule 68 settlement agreement is entitled to offset the settlement amount by any other 
amount collected by the offeree that rightfully belongs to the offeror.
142
 Miller bought a 
pre-fabricated building from VP Buildings (VP); he then contracted with Handle 
Construction Company (Handle) to assemble the building.
143
 Handle incurred more costs 
than it expected due to design defects caused by VP.
144
 Miller authorized Handle to 
negotiate with VP to recover its costs without assigning his contractual rights to 
Handle.
145
 Handle then sued Miller for the extra costs and Miller made a Rule 68 
settlement offer.
146
 Handle accepted Miller’s offer and simultaneously accepted a 
settlement offer from VP.
147
 Miller argued that the settlement offer amount should have 
been offset by the amount that Handle had collected from VP, but the superior court 
rejected his argument because the settlement offer had not explicitly allowed for an offset 
if Handle recovered from VP.
148
 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that every     
Rule 68 settlement offer implies that the offeror will give up a specific amount of money 
in exchange for certainty that the specified amount is the only money he will lose with 
respect to those claims.
149
 Therefore, if the money was rightfully Miller’s, then he should 
have been entitled to an offset.
150
 Reversing, the supreme court held that the offeror in a 
Rule 68 settlement agreement is entitled to offset the settlement amount by any other 
amount collected by the offeree that rightfully belongs to the offeror.
151
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Stevens v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Board 
In Stevens v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Board,
152
 the supreme court held that, 
when a municipality’s subordinate improperly exercises the power of the municipality, 
the procedural defect can be remedied by the municipality’s endorsement and adoption of 
the subordinate’s action.153 Stevens owned a bar that violated its Borough’s noise 
ordinance.
154
 The Borough’s Director of Planning and Land Use (Director) protested the 
bar’s liquor license before the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC) and the 
Borough’s attorneys advocated the Director’s position.155 ABC revoked the bar’s liquor 
license and the superior court affirmed the revocation.
156
 On appeal, Stevens argued that 
the Borough, not its employee, should have been required to file the protest or to 
officially delegate its powers to protest to the Director.
157
 The supreme court first noted 
that, under the municipal statute, it appeared that the Director did have authority to file a 
protest.
158
 But the court also noted that the Borough’s attorneys had litigated the 
Director’s position at every step of the way.159 The court reasoned that, even if there had 
been some procedural irregularity, the Borough’s endorsement of the Director’s action 
cured any possible procedural defect.
160
 The supreme court held that, when a 
municipality’s subordinate improperly exercises the power of the municipality, the 
procedural defect can be remedied by the municipality’s endorsement and adoption of the 
subordinate’s action.161 
 
Kalenka v. Infinity Insurance Co. 
In Kalenka v. Infinity Insurance Co.,
162
 the supreme court held that, although an injured 
party usually is allowed to choose its forum for litigation, the injured party waives that 
right by filing a counterclaim against an insurance company that is seeking a declaration 
that its policy does not cover the injured party.
163
 Kalenka’s car was rear-ended.164 The 
driver of the other vehicle became enraged and stabbed Kalenka, killing him.
165
 Infinity 
sought a declaratory judgment that it did not owe payments to Kalenka’s estate.166 
Kalenka’s estate filed a counterclaim for money allegedly owed under Kalenka’s 
insurance policy.
167
 The superior court did not completely dispose of the claims until 
after Kalenka’s estate had obtained a judgment against the owner of the vehicle that had 
rear-ended Kalenka’s car, over four years later.168 The superior court then held that 
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Kalenka’s insurance policy did not cover the circumstances surrounding Kalenka’s 
death.
169
 On appeal, Kalenka’s estate argued that the superior court should not have 
entered judgment for Infinity because there were still material factual issues related to the 
underlying tort claims.
170
 The supreme court noted that, generally, an injured party is 
allowed to choose the forum in which to litigate a tort claim.
171
 It also noted that an 
insurer’s interest in obtaining a declaratory judgment should not displace the injured 
party’s right to choose its own forum.172 Here, however, Infinity had initiated the 
declaratory judgment action to determine a very limited question; it was Kalenka’s estate 
that had chosen to litigate the underlying tort claims by filing a counterclaim.
173
 Further, 
the court had waited to dispose of the claims until Kalenka’s estate had litigated the 
underlying tort claims.
174
 Affirming, the supreme court held that, although an injured 
party usually is allowed to choose its forum for litigation, the injured party waives that 
right by filing a counterclaim against an insurance company that is seeking a declaration 
that its policy does not cover the injured party.
175
 
 
In re Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault 
In In re Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault,
176
 the supreme court 
held that the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault (ANDVSA) 
constitutes a public agency, therefore requiring the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) to 
provide representation to an indigent party in a child custody dispute in which the other 
party is represented by ANDVSA.
177
  A mother was represented by ANDVSA in a child 
custody dispute and the superior court appointed counsel from OPA for the indigent 
father.
178
  OPA sought to withdraw its representation and appealed, arguing that 
ANDVSA did not qualify as a public agency because it was funded by discretionary 
grants, because it was not a creature of any legislature, and because its Board of Directors 
was not appointed by any member of the Alaska or federal executive branch.
179
  The 
supreme court had previously limited the constitutional right to counsel in custody cases 
to situations where an indigent party’s opponent was represented by counsel provided by 
a public agency.
180
  The supreme court concluded that a public agency is an organization 
supported in large part by public funding sources, even if it is a private corporation; thus, 
ANDVSA qualified as a public agency because it received over 99 percent of its funding 
from federal and state government sources.
181
  Affirming, the supreme court held that 
ANDVSA constitutes a public agency, therefore requiring OPA to provide representation 
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to an indigent party in a child custody dispute in which the other party is represented by 
ANDVSA.
182
 
 
Griswold v. City of Homer 
In Griswold v. City of Homer,
183
 the supreme court held that an individual does not have 
standing to appeal the grant of a land-use permit when the permit will not adversely 
affect the use, enjoyment, or value of his personal property.
184
 Griswold appealed the 
grant of a conditional-use permit that he believed would create congestion and a visual 
blight on a public beach that he frequented.
185
  The city clerk denied his appeal for lack of 
standing because his interest in the property was no different from that of the general 
public.
186
  On appeal, Griswold argued that the standing requirement violated equal 
protection by discriminating against him as a litigant.
187
  The supreme court rejected this 
contention because there was a legitimate reason for disparate treatment:  limiting 
standing to individuals with a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the outcome of 
the litigation prevents excessive litigation and undue delay of a final disposition.
188
  The 
supreme court also concluded that the standing requirement bore a fair and substantial 
relationship to that legitimate reason and thus did not violate Griswold’s due process 
rights.
189
 The supreme court dismissed Griswold’s appeal, holding that an individual does 
not have standing to appeal the grant of a land-use permit when the permit will not 
adversely affect the use, enjoyment, or value of his personal property.
190
 
 
Trask v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough 
In Trask v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough,
191
 the supreme court held that an individual has 
standing to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a municipality files a civil 
complaint that actually and prospectively violates her First Amendment rights.
192
 Trask, a 
resident of the Ketchikan Gateway Borough, painted a religious message on her roof after 
receiving approval from the Borough that the message would not require a permit.
193
 The 
Borough subsequently sent Trask letters stating that the message violated the Borough’s 
code, threatened citations if she failed to remove the message, sought to enjoin her from 
displaying the message, and sought to fine her.
194
 Trask brought a § 1983 claim, but the 
superior court dismissed it after concluding that Trask lacked standing to litigate the 
constitutionality of the ordinance.
195
 On appeal, the supreme court noted that standing in 
Alaska is interpreted leniently.
196
 Thus, an individual with an identifiable trifle has 
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standing to litigate.
197
 The court reasoned that Trask’s injuries surpassed the level of 
trifling, because the Borough had ordered removal of the message, threatened Trask with 
citations, and filed a complaint against her.
198
 Moreover, because of the enforcement 
actions, Trask alleged that she had chosen not to modify the message.
199
 Reversing, the 
supreme court held that an individual has standing under § 1983 if a municipality files a 
civil complaint that violates the individual’s actual and prospective First Amendment 
rights.
200
 
 
Taylor v. Moutrie-Pelham 
In Taylor v. Moutrie-Pelham,
201
 the supreme court held that a trial court does not abuse 
its discretion by refraining from characterizing either party as the prevailing party if both 
parties prevail on a main issue of the action.
202
 Taylor alleged that Moutrie-Pelham had 
converted $30,000 of Taylor’s funds and breached a lease agreement.203 Moutrie-Pelham 
counterclaimed that Taylor had breached the lease agreement and owed $7,000 in unpaid 
rent.
204
 Taylor did not contest the unpaid rent portion of the breach claim.
205
 The trial 
court awarded $23,000 to Taylor on the conversion claim but awarded Moutrie-Pelham 
$10,574 on the breach claim and ruled that neither party had prevailed for the purpose of 
an attorneys’ fees award.206 The supreme court reasoned that the trial court’s prevailing 
party determination was not arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or improperly 
motivated because the breach claim had been a main issue in the case.
207
 Both parties had 
alleged breach of contract.
208
 Moutrie-Pelham had been awarded nearly half the amount 
that was awarded to Taylor.
209
 That the counterclaim had gone uncontested was irrelevant 
because Moutrie-Pelham had obtained the relief sought in the counterclaim.
210
 The 
supreme court affirmed, holding that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by 
refraining from characterizing either party as the prevailing party if both parties prevail 
on a main issue of the action.
211
  
 
Chilkoot Lumber Co., Inc. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc. 
In Chilkoot Lumber Co., Inc. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc.,
212
 the supreme court 
held that a settlement agreement made orally in court is enforceable even if the agreement 
is not later written down.
213
 Rainbow leased property and a dock from Chilkoot to use for 
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Rainbow’s fish-processing equipment.214 Chilkoot later sued Rainbow for unpaid rent.215 
Both parties agreed to a settlement, orally confirmed the agreement in superior court, and 
agreed to put the agreement in writing.
216
 But when the agreement was reduced to 
writing, Rainbow refused to sign.
217
 Rainbow subsequently failed to adhere to the terms 
of the agreement.
218
 Chilkoot moved to enforce the agreement, but the superior court 
denied its motion because no written agreement had been signed by Rainbow.
219
 On 
appeal, the supreme court reasoned that the original agreement was enforceable, even 
though it was not written, because an oral agreement made on the record in court is 
recognized as binding under both the Civil Rules and case law.
220
 As long as both parties 
state on the record that they intend to be bound by an agreement, a settlement agreement 
is enforceable.
221
 Reversing, the supreme court held that a settlement agreement made 
orally in court is enforceable even if the agreement is not later written down.
222
 
 
Kingery v. Barrett 
In Kingery v. Barrett,
223
 the supreme court held that, if a litigant moves for a new trial by 
arguing that the jury’s verdict went against the weight of the evidence, it is not reversible 
error for the superior court to deny the motion when conflicting evidence was presented 
at trial.
224
 Kingery and Barrett had a car accident; while Kingery was still in his car, a 
third car struck his vehicle.
225
 A year later, Kingery injured his back while operating a 
bulldozer.
226
 Then, two years after the car accident, Kingery sued Barrett for injuries that 
he had suffered in the accident.
227
 At trial, Kingery testified that he had not felt like he 
had been injured after the first collision, and his doctors could not say that the collision 
with Barrett had caused Kingery’s pain and back damage.228 A jury determined that 
Barrett’s negligence had not been a legal cause of Kingery’s injuries.229 On appeal, 
Kingery argued that he should have been entitled to a new trial because the jury verdict 
had gone against the weight of the evidence.
230
 The supreme court noted that, although 
Kingery’s injury and Barrett’s negligence had been undisputed, the evidence had not 
established that Barrett’s negligence caused Kingery’s injury.231 Because the evidence 
about causation conflicted, the supreme court would not reverse the superior court’s 
denial of a motion for a new trial.
232
 The supreme court held that, if a litigant moves for a 
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new trial by arguing that the jury’s verdict went against the weight of the evidence, it is 
not reversible error for the superior court to deny the motion when conflicting evidence 
was presented at trial.
233
 
 
3-D & Co. v. Tew’s Excavating, Inc. 
In 3-D & Co. v. Tew’s Excavating, Inc.,234 the supreme court held that a court’s request 
for supplemental briefing does not constitute an abuse of discretion when the request is 
sufficiently related to the substantive issues in dispute.
235
 3-D appealed a superior court’s 
determination that, although it had proven a breach of contract by Tew, 3-D had failed to 
prove damages to any degree of certainty and had failed to provide Tew with a 
reasonable opportunity to cure.
236
 3-D argued, in part, that the lower court had abused its 
discretion by requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on whether 3-D had a 
duty to give Tew notice and an opportunity to cure.
237
 The supreme court explained that 
Alaska courts have inherent discretionary authority to decide a case on a legal theory not 
presented by the parties, but advised that they should use this discretion sparingly.
238
 
Courts may consider new theories when the new theory applies to the transaction at issue, 
is related to the theories presented by the parties, and is necessary for a proper and just 
disposition of the case.
239
 Because the issues of notice and cure were tied to 3-D’s theory 
of the case, the supreme court affirmed and held that a court’s request for supplemental 
briefing does not constitute an abuse of discretion when the request is sufficiently related 
to the substantive issues in dispute.
240
 
 
Azimi v. Johns 
In Azimi v. Johns,
241
 the supreme court held that it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss a 
complaint with prejudice when a pro se litigant fails to fully comply with court orders 
due to medical concerns and confusion regarding what is required of him.
242
 Azimi and 
Johns were in a car accident, and Azimi filed a pro se complaint claiming that the 
accident had caused him physical injury and psychological problems.
243
 Azimi did not 
fully comply with the lower court’s pretrial order to provide exhibits and jury 
instructions, expressing confusion over the required materials and concern that 
complying with the order would affect his health.
244
 Johns moved to dismiss, arguing that 
Azimi’s failure to comply with the court’s pretrial order warranted involuntary 
dismissal.
245
 The lower court dismissed Azimi’s suit, and Azimi appealed.246 The 
supreme court reasoned that Azimi’s failure to present jury instructions and fully comply 
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with pre-trial orders had not amounted to willful noncompliance with the court order.
247
 
The court noted that Azimi had ultimately complied with most requests, and his mere 
failure to submit jury instructions had not warranted an involuntary dismissal.
248
 The 
supreme court held that it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss a complaint with prejudice 
when a pro se litigant fails to fully comply with court orders due to medical concerns and 
confusion regarding what is required of him.
249
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
top  
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit  
 
Vandevere v. Lloyd 
In Vandevere v. Lloyd,
250
 the Ninth Circuit held that lessees contractually waive their 
right to challenge state regulations as unconstitutional takings when their leases contain a 
waiver provision.
251
 Fishermen who held fishery leases sued the Alaska Commissioner of 
Fisheries when new regulations reduced the value of their leases; the fishermen argued 
that the regulations amounted to an unconstitutional taking.
252
 The district court held that 
the fishermen had waived any right to compensation by entering lease agreements that 
contained a provision permitting the State to create new regulations that might affect the 
value of the leases.
253
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit explained that the fishermen had to 
show they had a property interest in the leases; if the fishermen did have a property 
interest, they would have to show that the State’s expropriation of that interest amounted 
to a Fifth Amendment taking.
254
 The court then noted that property rights are creatures of 
state law and that, in the case of “new property” rights like the fishery leases, the state 
determines what interests an individual possesses.
255
 Here, the fishermen’s lease 
agreements explicitly stated that the leases would not limit the power of the State to adopt 
regulations affecting the value of the interest under the leases.
256
 The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the Takings Clause only prohibits uncompensated takings, that 
compensation can be contractually waived, and that the lease agreements contained such 
a contractual waiver.
257
 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that lessees contractually 
waive their right to challenge state regulations as unconstitutional takings when their 
leases contain a waiver provision.
258
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United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
 
American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression v. Sullivan 
In American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression v. Sullivan,
259
 the federal 
district court held that a statute criminalizing the knowing distribution of indecent 
materials to minors via the internet is unconstitutional if it is not narrowly tailored to 
avoid burdening the First Amendment rights of adults.
260
 Booksellers, libraries, and 
publishers alleged that AS 11.61.128, which criminalized the knowing distribution of 
indecent material to minors via the internet, violated the First Amendment.
261
 Applying 
strict scrutiny because the statute restricted speech based on the speech’s content, the 
court reasoned that “knowing distribution” is not the same as “knowing distribution to a 
person whom the distributor knows or should know is a minor.”262 The statute thus would 
have criminalized distribution even if the distributor did not know that the recipient was a 
minor.
263
 This would have a chilling effect on adults’ First Amendment rights because 
there are no reasonable technological means to ascertain the actual age of an individual 
on the internet.
264
 For this reason, the court determined that the statute had not been 
narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose.
265
 The federal district court held that a statute 
criminalizing the knowing distribution of indecent materials to minors via the internet is 
unconstitutional if it is not narrowly tailored to avoid burdening the First Amendment 
rights of adults.
266
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Pfeifer v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Pfeifer v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
267
 the supreme court held 
that a retroactive statute reducing Medicaid eligibility does not amount to an 
unconstitutional taking.
268
 Pfeifer met with a lawyer to discuss estate planning.
269
 She 
intended to give her son money in February 2007, but wanted to ensure that the gift 
would not prevent her from receiving Medicaid if she lived long enough to exhaust her 
assets.
270
 At the time of the gift, state Medicaid law provided that the penalty period for 
such asset transfers would begin immediately after the gift was given.
271
 But in 2008, the 
state legislature changed the penalty period so that it would begin running only after all 
of the Medicaid recipient’s assets were used up.272 The legislature gave the new law 
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retroactive effect to October 2006, before Pfeifer made her gift.
273
 Pfeifer’s son appealed 
the decision, but the administrative agency and the superior court upheld the validity of 
the penalty provision’s retroactive application.274 In the supreme court, he argued that the 
statute’s retroactive application amounted to an unconstitutional taking under the U.S. 
and Alaska Constitutions.
275
 The court stated that, in any takings analysis, the first 
consideration is whether the claimant has a protected property interest.
276
 The court 
reasoned that a future Medicaid benefit is not a property interest that has yet vested, and, 
at the time of her gift, Pfeifer had nothing more than an inchoate expectancy of 
eventually becoming eligible for the benefits.
277
 Thus, the supreme court held that a 
retroactive statute reducing Medicaid eligibility does not amount to an unconstitutional 
taking.
278
 
 
In re Tracy C. 
In In re Tracy C.,
279
 the supreme court held that, although a patient may be involuntarily 
committed only if she is gravely disabled at the time of her commitment hearing, a judge 
can consider the patient’s recent behavior, condition, and symptoms when making that 
determination.
280
  At her involuntary commitment hearing, Tracy’s doctor testified that 
although Tracy had improved since beginning treatment a few days before, she was still 
in an acute manic state and could relapse at any time without her medication.
281
  Based 
on this testimony, the probate master found her gravely disabled and recommended that 
the commitment petition be granted.
282
  On appeal, Tracy argued that the superior court 
had improperly based its commitment order on the symptoms she displayed at the time of 
admission when it should have based its decision on her condition at the time of the 
commitment hearing.
283
 The supreme court agreed that a commitment order must be 
based on a patient’s condition at the time of the hearing, but it concluded that recent 
behaviors and symptoms are also appropriate for the court to consider in ordering 
commitment.
284
  Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s order for 
involuntary commitment and held that while a patient may be involuntarily committed 
only if she is gravely disabled at the time of her commitment hearing, a judge can 
consider the patient’s recent behavior, condition, and symptoms when making that 
determination.
285
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CONTRACT LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
O’Connell v. Will 
In O’Connell v. Will,286 the supreme court held that a contractual provision requiring that 
a party pay attorneys’ fees in any lawsuit concerning the contract also requires the party 
to pay attorneys’ fees for costs incurred to collect on a judgment.287 A note contract 
between O’Connell and Will stated that, if a lawsuit was necessary to collect the note, a 
“reasonable attorney’s fee in such suit or action” would likewise be collected.288 When 
O’Connell sued Will to collect on the note, the superior court awarded attorneys’ fees for 
the fees incurred to obtain a judgment but held that, based on the contract, O’Connell was 
not entitled to attorneys’ fees for the fees incurred to collect on the judgment.289 On 
appeal, the supreme court interpreted the contractual clause, reasoning that “suit” 
encompasses any proceeding by a party in court and that a proceeding includes any 
ancillary steps, such as the enforcement of a judgment.
290
 Noting that contractual 
attorneys’ fees provisions must be construed broadly to promote efficient litigation, the 
court determined that O’Connell should have been awarded attorneys’ fees for the fees 
incurred to collect on his judgment.
291
 Reversing, the supreme court held that a 
contractual provision requiring that a party pay attorneys’ fees in any lawsuit concerning 
the contract also requires the party to pay attorneys’ fees for costs incurred to collect on a 
judgment.
292
 
 
Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
In Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
293
 the supreme court held that, for a verbal agreement 
to be enforceable through promissory estoppel, there must be an actual promise of action 
or forbearance that shows an intent to be bound to a contract with specified terms.
294
 
Safar contracted to construct six units in a condominium project.
295
 Partway through 
construction, Safar used up all of the money Wells Fargo had loaned to him.
296
 Safar put 
up his personal funds to make ends meet based on an alleged agreement that Wells Fargo 
would reimburse him.
297
 The trial court found that no such agreement existed.
298
 The 
supreme court noted that an actual promise (one of the necessary components of a verbal 
contract) must use precise language, contain basic terms of the agreement, and show an 
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intent to be bound by the contract.
299
 Safar could not identify any of the basic terms of the 
alleged agreement, not even the amount of money that Wells Fargo would loan to him.
300
 
The supreme court affirmed and held that, for a verbal agreement to be enforceable 
through promissory estoppel, there must be an actual promise of action or forbearance 
that shows an intent to be bound to a contract with specified terms.
301
 
 
Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc. 
In Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc.,
302
 the supreme court held that a duty to 
inquire whether a mistake has been made in a contract bid does not arise if the bidder 
bears the risk of its own mistake.
303
 Handle Construction Company (Handle) bid on a 
construction contract for Norcon.
304
 As the result of a unilateral mistake, Handle’s bid 
was 35 percent lower than any other bidder.
305
 Handle later sued Norcon for the 
additional costs that Handle had incurred during the construction.
306
 The superior court 
held that Handle bore the risk of its unilateral mistake and granted summary judgment to 
Norcon.
307
 On appeal, Handle argued that a 35 percent difference between Handle’s bid 
and any of the other bids should have alerted Norcon to a potential mistake and that 
Norcon had thus been obligated to inquire whether a mistake had been made.
308
 The 
supreme court reasoned that Handle’s argument, which was based on the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, does not apply to a party (like Handle) that bears the risk of its 
own mistake.
309
 The court further noted that, even if Handle had not borne the risk of its 
own mistake, a 35 percent difference would have been insufficient to create a duty, on 
Norcon’s part, to inquire.310 Affirming, the supreme court held that a duty to inquire 
whether a mistake has been made in a contract bid does not arise if the bidder bears the 
risk of its own mistake.
311
 
 
Chambers v. Scofield 
In Chambers v. Scofield,
312
 the supreme court held that the term “fair market cost,” in a 
settlement agreement regarding compensation for improvements made to property, does 
not encompass the time a party spends supervising the improvements.
313
 Chambers 
bought a triplex from Carley.
314
  Two years later, Carley’s daughter entered into a 
settlement agreement with Chambers to rescind the sale and compensate Chambers for 
                                                 
299
 Id. at 1120. 
300
 Id. 
301
 Id. at 1119–20. 
302
 264 P.3d 367 (Alaska 2011). 
303
 Id. at 374–75. 
304
 Id. at 369. 
305
 Id. at 374. 
306
 Id. at 370. 
307
 Id. at 371. 
308
 Id. at 374. 
309
 Id. 
310
 Id. 
311
 Id. at 374–75. 
312
 247 P.3d 982 (Alaska 2011).  
313
 Id. at 983.  
314
 Id.  
23 
 
the “fair market cost” of improvements he had made to the property.315 Chambers filed a 
motion to enforce the agreement, claiming that he was owed compensation for 
supervising the improvements and that such supervision falls under the category of 
“profit and overhead” typically charged to general contractors.316  Interpreting the 
agreement, the supreme court reasoned that it did not include the cost of supervising 
improvements because supervision was not mentioned in the agreement and because 
there is no industry standard clearly indicating that “fair market cost” includes the 
supervision of repairs.
317
  The court stated that if Chambers had desired a credit for 
supervision, he should have included that provision in the agreement.
318
  The supreme 
court held that the term “fair market cost,” in a settlement agreement regarding 
compensation for improvements made to property, does not encompass the time a party 
spends supervising the improvements.
319
  
 
Erkins v. Alaska Trustee, LLC 
In Erkins v. Alaska Trustee, LLC,
320
 the supreme court held that a disguised settlement 
provision in a forbearance agreement could constitute constructive fraud.
321
  Erkins sued 
Alaska Trustee, alleging fraud and misrepresentation in relation to a foreclosure 
proceeding on a delinquent loan.
322
  Alaska Trustee proposed a forbearance agreement 
staying the foreclosure proceeding for five months and Erkins agreed.
323
  One paragraph 
buried in the agreement was titled “RELEASE OF CLAIMS,” but the paragraph was not 
discussed or negotiated.
324
  The superior court construed the provision as a full waiver of 
Erkins’ claims and granted summary judgment to Alaska Trustee.325  On appeal, the 
supreme court reasoned that the agreement did not contain the terms that would be 
expected in a settlement agreement, and that a waiver of claims had not been discussed or 
highlighted as a central part of the agreement; thus, Alaska Trustee had an obligation to 
bring the waiver-of-claims language to Erkins’ attention.326  Reversing, the supreme court 
held that a disguised settlement provision in a forbearance agreement could constitute 
constructive fraud.
327
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Lord v. State 
In Lord v. State,
328
 the court of appeals held that the State’s “not guilty by reason of 
insanity” (NGRI) defense statutes are constitutional because the State must still prove the 
mental state required under any particular criminal statute.
329
 After a murder trial, Lord 
was found guilty but mentally ill.
330
 On appeal, she argued that the statutes setting out the 
NGRI defense were unconstitutional because they permit conviction when the defendant 
does not have the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct.
331
 The court of 
appeals noted that the U.S. Constitution does not require an inquiry into a defendant’s 
mental state so long as the government proves that she acted with the mens rea required 
by a criminal statute.
332
 The court of appeals also rejected the notion that the Alaska 
Constitution should be interpreted more broadly than the U.S. Constitution because the 
determination of the point at which a defendant’s mental condition justifies exculpation is 
a question for the legislature, not the judiciary.
333
 Affirming, the court of appeals held 
that the State’s NGRI defense statutes are constitutional because the State must still prove 
the mental state required under the particular criminal statute.
334
 
 
Liddicoat v. State 
In Liddicoat v. State,
335
 the court of appeals held that a steak knife constitutes a “deadly 
weapon” for the purposes of the fifth-degree weapons misconduct statute.336 Liddicoat 
was convicted of fifth-degree weapons misconduct for carrying a concealed steak 
knife.
337
 The weapons statute defines a “deadly weapon” as a weapon that is “designed 
for and capable of causing death or serious physical injury.”338 On appeal, Liddicoat 
argued that, because a steak knife is not designed to cause serious physical injury, the 
trial court should have granted him a directed verdict.
339
 The court of appeals noted that 
the statute’s examples of “deadly weapons” included some (an axe, for example) that are 
not designed to cause serious physical injury.
340
 Further, that the legislature had excluded 
ordinary pocket knives from previous weapons statutes signaled that the legislature had 
intended to include other types of knives in the current weapons statute.
341
 Accordingly, 
                                                 
328
 262 P.3d 855 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011). 
329
 Id. at 861–62. 
330
 Id. 
331
 Id. at 861. 
332
 Id. 
333
 Id. at 862. 
334
 Id. at 861–62. 
335
 268 P.3d 355 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011). 
336
 Id. at 361. 
337
 Id. at 356–57. 
338
 Id. at 359. 
339
 Id. 
340
 Id. at 359–60. 
341
 Id. at 360–61. 
25 
 
the court of appeals held that a steak knife constitutes a “deadly weapon” for the purposes 
of the fifth-degree weapons misconduct statute.
342
 
 
Strane v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Strane v. Municipality of Anchorage,
343
 the court of appeals held that, for the 
Municipality of Anchorage’s concealment of merchandise ordinance to be constitutional, 
the government must prove that the defendant knowingly placed merchandise out of sight 
and did so with the intent to conceal the merchandise from its rightful owner.
344
 Strane 
placed items from his shopping cart into plastic bags.
345
 After bypassing the checkout 
aisles and nearing the exit door, Strane noticed a uniformed manager standing nearby.
346
 
He abandoned his cart, attempted to leave the store, and was arrested.
347
 At trial, the 
judge did not instruct the jury that, to find Strane guilty, the Municipality was required to 
prove that he had acted with the intent to hide the merchandise.
348
 On review, the court of 
appeals reasoned that there are a number of potential innocent circumstances in which 
individuals might conceal a purchased or unpurchased item that they intend to pay for 
before leaving a store.
349
 Therefore, the ordinance must be interpreted to require proof of 
something more than a person’s act of knowingly concealing merchandise while on 
commercial premises.
350
 Reversing, the court of appeals held that, for the Municipality of 
Anchorage’s concealment of merchandise ordinance to be constitutional, the government 
must prove that the defendant knowingly placed merchandise out of sight and did so with 
the intent to conceal the merchandise from its rightful owner.
351
 
 
Dawson v. State 
In Dawson v. State,
352
 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s disorderly conduct statute, 
AS 11.61.110, which prohibits “fighting other than in self-defense,” requires fighters to 
have a mutuality of intent and therefore does not cover all situations where one person 
strikes another.
353
 Dawson was charged with fourth-degree assault for striking her 
domestic partner with her fists and a baking pan.
354
 At trial, her attorney requested a jury 
instruction on the lesser offense of disorderly conduct.
355
 The lower court refused to grant 
the request, concluding that “fighting,” as used in the context of the disorderly conduct 
statute, required a mutual physical struggle.
356
 Dawson was convicted of assault and 
appealed.
357
 The court of appeals extensively reviewed similar common law statutes and 
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the current disorderly-conduct statute’s legislative history.358 In doing so, the court 
recognized that it had erred in a previous, unpublished opinion in which it had held that 
the term “fighting” included fights that are one-sided due to the choice, surprise, or 
superior ability of one of the fighters.
359
  Affirming, the court of appeals held that the 
disorderly conduct statute requires fighters to have a mutuality of intent and therefore 
does not cover all situations where one person strikes another.
360
 
 
Olson v. State 
In Olson v. State,
361
 the court of appeals held that a hand cannot be considered a 
“dangerous instrument” for purposes of first-degree assault when no evidence is 
presented showing that the assault was likely to inflict serious injury.
362
 Olson hit his 
girlfriend with an open hand.
363
 The blow broke her jaw.
364
 He was convicted of first- 
and second-degree assault.
365
 The superior court granted Olson’s motion for acquittal on 
the first-degree assault charge because Olson had not used a “dangerous instrument” in 
the attack.
366
 The State argued on appeal that Olson had used his hand as a “dangerous 
instrument” and that it was therefore error for the lower court to grant a judgment of 
acquittal for the first-degree assault charge.
367
 The court of appeals noted that, when 
determining whether a “dangerous instrument” was used in an assault, the fact finder 
must examine the consequences that were reasonably likely to ensue from the defendant’s 
actions (given the type of object used and the circumstances in which the object was 
used).
368
 Applying this test, the court determined that there was no evidence, aside from 
the injury, that Olson used his hand in a manner that was likely to cause death or inflict 
serious injury.
369
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a hand cannot be considered a 
“dangerous instrument” for purposes of first-degree assault when no evidence is 
presented showing that the assault was likely to inflict serious injury.
370
 
 
Rupeiks v. State 
In Rupeiks v. State,
371
 the court of appeals held that a hand may be deemed a “dangerous 
instrument” to support a conviction of third-degree assault when the manner of the 
assault shows the presence of an actual and substantial risk of serious bodily injury or 
death.
372
 Rupeiks drove to Christensen’s campsite after they had a disagreement.373 When 
Christensen approached Rupeiks’ truck and bent down to identify the driver, Rupeiks 
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grabbed Christensen’s arm and yanked his torso into the truck.374 Rupeiks then clubbed 
Christensen in the face, and drove the vehicle while continuing to hold Christensen’s 
arm.
375
 The jury found Rupeiks guilty of third-degree assault and agreed in a special 
verdict form that Rupeiks’ hand or fist had been used as a “dangerous instrument.”376 
Rupeiks appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s 
finding.
377
 The court of appeals reasoned that the manner and circumstances of the assault 
showed that Rupeiks had used his hand as a “dangerous instrument.”378  Rupeiks had 
used his hand to hold Christensen’s arm in the truck, which substantially limited 
Christensen’s ability to defend himself.379 Moreover, the jury heard testimony that 
Rupeiks had punched Christensen in the face repeatedly, with enough force to fracture his 
facial bones.
380
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a hand may be deemed a 
“dangerous instrument” to support a conviction of third-degree assault when the manner 
of the assault shows the presence of an actual and substantial risk of serious bodily injury 
or death.
381
 
 
Delay-Wilson v. State 
In Delay-Wilson v. State,
382
 the court of appeals held that criminal liability for issuing a 
bad check is not established by merely endorsing a check issued by a third party.
383
 A 
company issued a check to Delay-Wilson’s daughter, who in turn endorsed it payable to 
Delay-Wilson; Delay-Wilson then endorsed the bad check and deposited it in her own 
bank account.
384
 Delay-Wilson was convicted of issuing a bad check.
385
 On appeal, she 
argued that simply signing the check was not sufficient to establish liability under the 
statute governing the offense of issuing a bad check.
386
 The court of appeals analyzed the 
language of the bad-check statute, finding that the offense requires proof that the 
defendant authorized the check in question.
387
 Because the check at issue purported to 
authorize payment from a third party’s account, Delay-Wilson did not actually authorize 
payment from an account she owned.
388
 Reversing, the court of appeals held that criminal 
liability for issuing a bad check is not established by merely endorsing a check issued by 
a third party.
389
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Darroux v. State 
In Darroux v. State,
390
 the court of appeals held that the statutory mitigator in                
AS 12.55.155(d)(7) cannot be used to reduce the presumptive sentence of a defendant 
who has already successfully argued that he should be convicted of a lesser included 
offense based on a claim of provocation.
391
 Darroux shot and killed a man; although he 
was charged with second-degree murder, a jury found him guilty of manslaughter 
because he had been “serious[ly] provo[ked].”392 Darroux argued that his presumptive 
sentence should be mitigated because AS 12.55.155(d)(7) provides that a mitigating 
factor can be found if “the victim provoked the crime to a significant degree.” The 
superior court rejected Darroux’s proposed mitigating factor and Darroux appealed.393 
The court of appeals noted that the degree of provocation necessary to apply the 
mitigating factor in AS 12.55.155(d)(6), “serious provocation,” is the same degree of 
provocation that is necessary to reduce a murder to manslaughter.
394
 But AS 12.55.155(e) 
forbids the application of a mitigating factor that was raised at trial and reduced the 
defendant’s conviction to a lesser included offense.395 The court reasoned that it would be 
illogical to forbid the defendant from mitigating his sentence due to “serious 
provocation” under AS 12.55.155(d)(6), but then allow the defendant to mitigate his 
sentence due to lesser, “significant,” provocation under AS 12.55.155(d)(7).396 
Affirming, the court of appeals held that the statutory mitigator in AS 12.55.155(d)(7) 
cannot be used to reduce the presumptive sentence of a defendant who has already 
successfully argued that he should be convicted of a lesser included offense based on a 
claim of provocation.
397
 
 
Wiglesworth v. State 
In Wiglesworth v. State,
398
 the court of appeals held that a defendant can only be 
convicted of one count of second-degree controlled substance misconduct when evidence 
shows that he possessed several different prohibited substances, on several different 
occasions, in the course of an ongoing methamphetamine manufacturing scheme.
399
 
Police investigation revealed that on three dates Wiglesworth possessed several 
chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine.
400
 He was charged with six counts of 
second-degree controlled substance misconduct, one for each substance and date, and 
convicted on each count.
401
 He appealed and argued that, because he possessed the 
chemicals as part of one ongoing manufacturing operation, he should have been 
convicted of only one count.
402
 The court of appeals concluded that the gravamen of the 
offense is the assembly of materials necessary to manufacture methamphetamine, and 
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there is no societal interest in the accused’s possession of each individual chemical.403 
The court reasoned that it would be illogical to convict a defendant of multiple felony 
counts (one for each ingredient) if he was interrupted partway through the manufacturing 
process, but of only one count if he completed the same process.
404
 Reversing, the court 
of appeals held that a defendant can only be convicted of one count of second-degree 
controlled substance misconduct when evidence shows that he possessed several different 
prohibited substances, on several different occasions, in the course of an ongoing 
methamphetamine manufacturing scheme.
405
 
 
Scharen v. State 
In Scharen v. State,
406
 the court of appeals held that, in a driving-under-the-influence 
case, an individual who turned on his car in order to stay warm after leaving a bar is not 
entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of necessity.
407
 Scharen left a bar, planning to 
sleep in his car, and started the engine for warmth.
408
 At trial, Scharen requested a jury 
instruction on the defense of necessity; the district court refused to give the instruction.
409
 
The court of appeals reasoned that Scharen was not entitled to a jury instruction on the 
defense of necessity because he knowingly brought about the dangerous situation (death 
or serious injury due to freezing) by leaving the bar with the intention of sleeping in his 
car.
410
 Additionally, the court of appeals noted that Scharen had reasonable alternatives to 
prevent the dangerous situation which would not have required him to operate a motor 
vehicle.
411
 The court of appeals held that, in a driving-under-the-influence case, an 
individual who turned on his car in order to stay warm after leaving a bar is not entitled to 
a jury instruction on the defense of necessity.
412
 
 
Leu v. State 
In Leu v. State,
413
 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s domestic violence statute, which 
applies to individuals who “have engaged in a sexual relationship,” is not 
unconstitutionally vague.
414
 Leu and his friend had sex on occasion, but had not had sex 
for five months.
415
 Leu and his friend were drinking, began fighting, and Leu punched his 
friend repeatedly.
416
 A jury convicted Leu of fourth-degree domestic violence assault.
417
 
At sentencing, the district court held that Leu’s assault qualified as a domestic violence 
crime because Leu and the victim had previously engaged in a sexual relationship.
418
 On 
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appeal, Leu argued that the domestic violence statute was unconstitutionally vague on its 
face.
419
 The court of appeals reasoned that (1) the term “sexual relationship” is not so 
ambiguous that it gives inadequate notice of what conduct it proscribes in every instance 
and (2) Leu had not presented any evidence of selective or arbitrary enforcement.
420
 
Affirming, the court of appeals held that Alaska’s domestic violence statute, which 
applies to individuals who “have engaged in a sexual relationship,” is not 
unconstitutionally vague.
421
 
 
Bridge v. State 
In Bridge v. State,
422
 the court of appeals held that an escapee cannot be charged with 
second-degree felony escape from a correctional facility unless the escapee’s presence at 
the facility is forcibly maintained by corrections officers or guards acting as agents of the 
Department of Corrections (DOC).
423
  Bridge was charged with a misdemeanor and, 
when he was unable to make bail, was placed in a halfway house under contract with 
DOC.
424
  Bridge left the halfway house without permission and was later arrested and 
charged with second-degree felony escape.
425
 At trial, the judge instructed the jury that 
the halfway house was a “correctional facility” under the statute, without hearing 
evidence regarding the restraints used on individuals in the halfway house.
426
 On appeal 
following his conviction, Bridge argued that the halfway house was not a “correctional 
facility” within the meaning of the felony escape statute.427  The court of appeals agreed, 
determining that a “correctional facility” did not include any facility used for housing a 
person under official detention but was instead limited to facilities used for the 
confinement of detained persons.
428
  The court defined a facility for confinement as one 
which employs physical restraints and guards for the purpose of maintaining security 
over prisoners required to remain in that facility.
429
  Reversing, the court of appeals held 
that an escapee cannot be charged with second-degree felony escape from a correctional 
facility unless the escapee’s presence at the facility is forcibly maintained by corrections 
officers or guards acting as agents of DOC.
430
 
 
Cleveland v. State 
In Cleveland v. State,
431
 the court of appeals held that an individual may be convicted of a 
separate kidnapping offense when the evidence shows that the restraint used in the 
kidnapping is more than merely incidental to the commission of another offense.
432
 
Cleveland and two others took a woman to a trailer, where over the course of at least two 
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days they threatened her, beat her, and sexually abused her.
433
 Cleveland was convicted 
of sexual assault, coercion, kidnapping, assault, misconduct involving a weapon, and 
harassment.
434
 Cleveland appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to 
establish the element of restraint for the kidnapping conviction.
435
 The court of appeals 
recognized that a restraint merely incidental to another offense does not constitute a 
separate offense.
436
 The court upheld the conviction, however, identifying five factors to 
consider in determining whether a restraint was incidental to the other offense: (1) the 
duration of the restraint, (2) the movement of the victim during the restraint, (3) whether 
the restraint exceeded what was necessary for the commission of the other offenses,      
(4) whether the restraint increased the risk of harm beyond the other offenses, and         
(5) whether the restraint had some independent purpose.
437
 The court reasoned that, 
although the trial court had not instructed the jury on these factors, the evidence in the 
case was sufficient to find that the kidnapping was not incidental to Cleveland’s separate 
offenses.
438
 The court of appeals held that an individual may be convicted of a separate 
kidnapping offense when the evidence shows that the restraint used in the kidnapping is 
more than merely incidental to the commission of another offense.
439
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Kalmakoff v. State 
In Kalmakoff v. State,
440
 the supreme court held that (1) a fifteen-year-old is “in custody” 
for Miranda purposes when he has no previous history of contact with law enforcement 
and is called out of class by his principal, driven by a police officer to an interview with 
police, and not told that he is free to leave; and (2) when the police have flagrantly 
violated a suspect’s right to silence during an interview, subsequent interviews are 
sufficiently tainted to require suppression if the police obtained important incriminating 
information from the suspect during the first interview and then use that information to 
convince the suspect to acquiesce to further interviews.
441
 Fifteen year-old Kalmakoff 
was interviewed four times by police in connection with a murder.
442
 Kalmakoff was 
pulled out of a classroom by his principal; a police officer then drove him to the city 
office for questioning.
443
 The police officers did not tell Kalmakoff he was free to leave, 
nor did they give him Miranda warnings.
444
 During the course of questioning, he made 
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incriminating statements.
445
 At another interview at the city office the following day, 
Kalmakoff told the officers that he wanted to stop the interview and go back to school, 
but the officers continued questioning him.
446
 Three hours later, the officers went to 
Kalmakoff’s home and (again without giving Miranda warnings) encouraged him to tell 
his grandparents what he had already told the officers.
447
 Kalmakoff again made 
incriminating statements.
448
 The next day, the officers took Kalmakoff out of class and 
asked him to show them the murder site.
449
 Kalmakoff made several more incriminating 
statements, at which point the officers administered Miranda warnings.
450
 The officers 
then videotaped Kalmakoff’s confession while he showed them the crime scene.451 The 
superior court held, first, that Kalmakoff had not been in custody when he was taken 
from the school to his first interview; second, that he had been in custody for his second 
interview, and the failure to give Miranda warnings rendered those statements 
inadmissible; third, that he had not been in custody for the third interview, and that the 
taint of the earlier Miranda violation was sufficiently attenuated to render those 
statements admissible; and fourth, that he had validly waived his Miranda rights during 
the fourth interview, rendering his confession admissible.
452
 The court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that the last two interviews were admissible because they were not 
tainted by the earlier Miranda violations.
453
 The court of appeals determined that it did 
not have enough information about the first interview to decide whether Kalmakoff had 
been in custody when he was taken to the city office but that any error in admitting the 
statements from the first interview was harmless.
454
 The supreme court granted leave to 
appeal and remanded for fact-finding regarding the first interview.
455
 The court 
determined that, although Kalmakoff had not been formally arrested prior to his first 
interview, his freedom of movement had been so restrained that a reasonable person in 
his position would not have felt free to leave or to stop the questioning.
456
 The court 
noted his age, that he had been escorted by a police officer from the school to the city 
office, that he was not offered the opportunity to speak with his family before the 
interview, and that the officers questioned Kalmakoff in an accusatory manner.
457
 The 
court then noted that Kalmakoff had been in custody for the second interview but had not 
received Miranda warnings and that, when he had invoked his right to silence, the 
officers had ignored him and continued the questioning.
458
 Finally, the court determined 
that the officers’ flagrant Miranda violations in the first and second interviews 
sufficiently tainted the last two interviews to render statements from those interviews 
                                                 
445
 Id. 
446
 Id. at 113–14. 
447
 Id. at 115. 
448
 Id. 
449
 Id. 
450
 Id. 
451
 Id. 
452
 Id. at 116–17. 
453
 Id. at 117–18. 
454
 Id. at 117. 
455
 Id. at 118. 
456
 Id. at 122. 
457
 Id. at 122–23. 
458
 Id. at 126. 
33 
 
inadmissible.
459
 In particular, the court noted that the officers had asked Kalmakoff to 
repeat and explain incriminating statements that he had made during the earlier, improper 
interviews.
460
 Reversing, the supreme court held that 1) a fifteen-year-old is “in custody” 
for Miranda purposes when he has no previous history of contact with law enforcement 
and is called out of a class by his principal, driven by a police officer to an interview with 
police, and not told that he is free to leave; and 2) when the police have flagrantly 
violated a suspect’s right to silence during an interview, subsequent interviews are 
sufficiently tainted to require suppression if the police obtained important incriminating 
information from the suspect during the first interview and then use that information to 
convince the suspect to acquiesce to further interviews.
461
 
 
Olson v. State 
In Olson v. State,
462
 the supreme court held that when the police voluntarily give 
information to an arrestee, and that information turns out to be incorrect, the arrestee 
bears the burden of proving prejudice from the erroneous communication.
463
 Olson was 
arrested for driving while intoxicated and the police asked for a breath sample.
464
 
Because the police were required to inform him of the consequences of refusal, an officer 
read to him an implied consent form.
465
 The form was out-of-date and stated that, if an 
arrestee was convicted twice in the previous five years of driving while intoxicated or 
refusing to take a chemical test, refusing to take the breath test could result in a class C 
felony.
466
 But the law had changed to include a ten year look-back provision.
467
 Olson, 
who had two violations from the previous six years, refused the test and was convicted of 
a class C felony.
468
 Olson appealed, claiming that his due process rights had been violated 
by the improper notice.
469
 The lower court ruled in favor of the State, holding that Olson 
was required to show that the misinformation actually induced him to refuse the chemical 
test and that Olson had not shown sufficient evidence of inducement.
470
 Although the 
supreme court agreed with the lower court, holding that Olson must produce evidence 
that he was actually prejudiced by the improper warning, the court reversed and 
remanded the case.
471
 The court reasoned that Olson had not been aware that he needed to 
produce evidence that his refusal to take the breath test was induced by the 
misinformation he received, and a remand was necessary to allow him the opportunity to 
make that showing.
472
 The supreme court held that when the police voluntarily give 
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information to an arrestee, and that information turns out to be incorrect, the arrestee 
bears the burden of proving prejudice from the erroneous communication.
473
 
 
State v. Carlin 
In State v. Carlin,
474
 the supreme court held that, if a criminal defendant dies while 
appealing a conviction, the conviction will stand unless the defendant’s estate proceeds 
with an appeal.
475
 Carlin died in prison while directly appealing his conviction.
476
 The 
supreme court had previously adopted the doctrine of abatement ab initio, under which 
appellate courts permanently abated a criminal defendant’s conviction if the criminal 
defendant died while his appeal was pending.
477
 The court decided to depart from that 
doctrine for two reasons. First, legal conditions had changed because victims’ rights had 
recently been expanded and other states had recently diversified their positions on 
abatement.
478
 Second, the benefits to crime victims of rejecting the doctrine of full 
abatement outweighed the benefits of stare decisis.
479
 The supreme court held that, if a 
criminal defendant dies while appealing a conviction, the conviction will stand unless the 
defendant’s estate proceeds with an appeal.480 
 
Adams v. State 
In Adams v. State,
481
 the supreme court held that the admission of a prosecutor’s 
comments about a defendant’s pre- or post-arrest silence constitutes plain error.482  
During the defendant’s trial for sexual assault, the prosecutor asked the defendant on 
cross-examination to admit that he had refused to speak with the police.
483
  The 
prosecutor also highlighted the defendant’s pretrial silence during the closing statement, 
arguing that the defendant’s refusal to speak undermined his credibility and that the 
defendant had changed his decision to remain silent only after learning that DNA 
evidence showed that he had had sex with the victim.
484
  Although Adams’ attorney did 
not object to either the cross-examination or the closing argument, Adams argued on 
appeal that the trial court’s admission of the prosecutor’s comments was plain error.485  
The court of appeals concluded that the admission of the prosecutor’s statements had not 
amounted to plain error.
486
  The supreme court disagreed, explaining that the Alaska 
Constitution protects a criminal defendant’s post-arrest silence to a greater degree than 
the U.S. Constitution.
487
 But the supreme court decided that it did not need to determine 
in this case whether the Alaska Constitution protects pre-arrest statements to the same 
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extent that it protects post-arrest statements.
488
  The court noted that Evidence Rule 403 
protects a defendant’s pre-arrest silence by rendering it inadmissible in most cases 
because the high risk of unfair prejudice usually outweighs its inherently low probative 
value.
489
 Reversing, the supreme court held that the admission of a prosecutor’s 
comments about a defendant’s pre- or post-arrest silence constitutes plain error.490 
 
Stone v. State 
In Stone v. State,
491
 the supreme court held that the U.S. Constitution requires that court-
appointed counsel, upon request by a defendant, file a petition for discretionary sentence 
review after the defendant has been sentenced pursuant to a lawful plea agreement.
492
 
Stone was charged with manslaughter and submitted to a plea agreement.
493
 He received 
a sentence which, excluding a suspended portion, did not exceed his plea agreement.
494
  
Stone wanted to appeal his sentence as excessive, but his counsel concluded that Stone 
had no appealable issues and took no further action.
495
 After the lower courts upheld the 
attorney’s refusal to assist Stone with an appeal, Stone petitioned the supreme court, 
arguing that he had a federal constitutional right to require his counsel to seek appellate 
review.
496
 The supreme court agreed.
497
 Although a defendant may not appeal a sentence 
that is in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement, a defendant may file a petition for 
discretionary review under the Alaska appellate rules.
498
 The court held that a defendant’s 
right to counsel allows the defendant to require his counsel to assist him with this 
petition.
499
 The court further stated that if counsel feels that the defendant’s claim is 
“wholly frivolous,” the attorney must get the court’s permission to withdraw from the 
case.
500
 Granting Stone leave to file a petition for review of his sentence, the court held 
that the U.S. Constitution requires that court-appointed counsel, upon request by a 
defendant, file a petition for discretionary sentence review after the defendant has been 
sentenced pursuant to a lawful plea agreement.
501
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Weil v. State 
In Weil v. State,
502
 the court of appeals held that an officer is justified in making a 
community caretaker stop if the officer acts to prevent a potential hazard to the public.
503
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Weil was riding his four-wheeler down a gravel road at night, heading toward a busy 
road.
504
 Weil’s dog was walking in the middle of the road, tethered to Weil’s four-
wheeler by a twenty-foot leash.
505
 An officer stopped Weil before the four-wheeler or the 
dog reached the main road, and the officer noticed that Weil was intoxicated.
506
 Weil was 
charged with driving under the influence.
507
 Arguing that the stop was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion, Weil moved to suppress the evidence.
508
 The officer testified that 
he had stopped Weil because he had thought it would have been dangerous for Weil and 
Weil’s dog to cross the highway.509 The lower court denied the motion to suppress and 
held that the stop was a valid community caretaker stop.
510
 The court of appeals affirmed, 
reasoning that the stop had not been investigatory, but rather had been made to avoid a 
potentially dangerous situation.
511
 Because Weil’s conduct had posed an imminent public 
danger, the officer had been warranted in stopping Weil before an accident occurred.
512
 
Affirming, the court of appeals held that an officer is justified in making a community 
caretaker stop if the officer acts to prevent a potential hazard to the public.
513
   
 
Estes v. State 
In Estes v. State,
514
 the court of appeals held that out-of-court statements, introduced to 
provide necessary context for understanding admissible evidence, do not violate the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.515 Estes and her husband were charged with the 
murder of Estes’ cousin.516 Estes was convicted of first-degree murder.517 At Estes’ 
murder trial, the State introduced the contents of a phone conversation between Estes and 
her husband’s cousin and another conversation between Estes and state troopers.518 On 
appeal, Estes argued that these out-of-court statements constituted “testimonial hearsay” 
and were therefore inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.
519
 The court of appeals 
determined that the evidence had a non-hearsay purpose because it allowed the jury to 
understand admissible evidence; it had not been offered to prove the truth of the 
conversations’ contents.520 Affirming, the court of appeals held that out-of-court 
statements, introduced to provide necessary context for understanding admissible 
evidence, do not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.521 
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James v. State 
In James v. State,
522
 the court of appeals held that sex offender educational classes can be 
imposed as parole conditions, without violating the federal and state ex post facto 
clauses, on prisoners who were convicted before the enactment of a 1985 statute that 
specifically authorized such educational classes.
523
 James was convicted of attempted 
sexual assault and sexual abuse of a minor in 1979.
524
 In 1985 Alaska enacted a statute 
authorizing courts to impose mandatory attendance of sex offender education classes for 
sex offenders.
525
 James was paroled subject to conditions including the attendance of a 
sex offender education class; when he refused to cooperate with his treatment, his parole 
was revoked and the revocation was upheld by the superior court.
526
 The court of appeals 
reasoned that, although the 1985 parole statute specifically authorized sex offender 
classes, a statute in force when James was convicted had generally authorized courts to 
impose special parole conditions (including, presumably, sex offender classes).
527
 
Affirming, the court of appeals held that sex offender educational classes can be imposed 
as parole conditions, without violating the federal and state ex post facto clauses, on 
prisoners who were convicted before the enactment of a 1985 statute that specifically 
authorized such educational classes.
528
 
 
Lindeman v. State 
In Lindeman v. State,
529
 the court of appeals held that, when supplemental jury 
instructions constructively amend an indictment, an appellate attorney provides 
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise a constructive amendment 
argument.
530
 Lindeman was charged with first-degree murder in an indictment alleging 
that Lindeman had assaulted his victim, intending to cause death.
531
 The jury convicted 
Lindeman of second-degree murder following a supplemental jury instruction stating that 
the jury could convict under a theory of extreme indifference.
532
 At a post-conviction 
relief hearing, the superior court held that Lindeman’s lawyer had provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to raise a constructive amendment argument.
533
 The court of appeals 
reasoned that there were reasonably promising arguments that the supplemental jury 
instruction constituted a constructive amendment of Lindeman’s indictment and that 
Lindeman had been prejudiced by the constructive amendment because he had lost the 
opportunity to present any evidence or arguments against the new theory.
534
 The court of 
appeals held that, when supplemental jury instructions constructively amend an 
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indictment, an appellate attorney provides ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 
raise a constructive amendment argument.
535
 
 
Korkow v. State 
In Korkow v. State,
536
 the court of appeals held that, when a defendant has received a 
lengthy prison sentence and is not statutorily eligible for parole until far into the future, it 
may be excessive for the sentencing judge to restrict the defendant’s eligibility for parole 
beyond the statutory restriction.
537
 Korkow killed his wife, stabbing her at least sixty-two 
times while the couple’s children were present.538 He was convicted of first-degree 
murder.
539
 Although he did not have an extensive prior criminal history, he was 
sentenced to the maximum term of ninety-nine years in prison.
540
 The trial judge then 
restricted Korkow’s eligibility for parole until after he had served fifty years.541 This 
restriction was based both on the severity of his attack and on the presence of children 
during the murder.
542
 The court of appeals noted that, by statute, Korkow would have 
been required to serve at least thirty-three years before becoming eligible for parole.
543
 
The court stated that, when a defendant will be serving a lengthy sentence, it is preferable 
to allow questions of discretionary parole release to be decided by the Parole Board.
544
 
Reversing, the court of appeals held that, when a defendant has received a lengthy prison 
sentence and is not statutorily eligible for parole until far into the future, it may be 
excessive for the sentencing judge to restrict the defendant’s eligibility for parole beyond 
the statutory restriction.
545
 
 
Bates v. State 
In Bates v. State,
546
 the court of appeals held that the statutory definition of “household 
member,” which is incorporated into the rules of evidence, is not impermissibly vague.547 
Bates was convicted of assault and attempted murder after he attacked his former 
girlfriend and two other people in her apartment.
548
 The lower court concluded that Bates' 
former girlfriend was a “household member” as defined by statute because they had dated 
and had been involved in a sexual relationship.
549
 The attack was thus a crime of 
domestic violence which, under the rules of evidence, allowed the State to present 
evidence of Bates’ two prior assaults.550 On appeal, Bates argued that the definitions of 
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“sexual relationship” and “dating” were impermissibly vague.551 The court of appeals 
reasoned that, because Bates challenged a rule of evidence and not a substantive criminal 
law, the traditional problems with vagueness did not apply; therefore, for the statute to be 
impermissibly vague, it would have to be impossible for a court to give it meaning.
552
 
The court determined that both “dating” and “sexual relationship” were definite enough 
to be given meaning.
553
 Thus, the court of appeals held that the statutory definition of 
“household member,” which is incorporated into the rules of evidence, is not 
impermissibly vague.
554
 
 
Langevin v. State 
In Langevin v. State,
555
 the court of appeals held that (1) whether the state has introduced 
sufficient corroborating evidence to admit a defendant's confession is an evidentiary 
question to be determined by a judge and (2) if the judge erroneously admits a 
confession, the remedy is a new trial rather than an acquittal.
556
 Langevin was convicted 
of driving under the influence, based solely on his confession, despite his objection to the 
confession’s introduction as evidence.557 Under state law, a defendant cannot be 
convicted based solely on his or her confession.
558
 The court of appeals reasoned that, 
since the rule against uncorroborated confessions is more like a rule of evidence than an 
element of any crime, the determination of whether a confession is corroborated should 
be made by the trial judge.
559
 The court further reasoned that, since the remedy for 
evidentiary errors is a new trial rather than an acquittal, Langevin should be entitled only 
to a new trial.
560
 Reversing, the court of appeals held that (1) whether the state has 
introduced sufficient corroborating evidence to admit a defendant's confession is an 
evidentiary question to be determined by a judge and (2) if the judge erroneously admits 
a confession, the remedy is a new trial rather than an acquittal.
561
 
 
Booth v. State 
In Booth v. State,
562
 the court of appeals held that when a defendant (1) shows that 
information possibly contained in a police officer’s personnel file would be relevant to 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence and (2) presents a factual predicate for the discovery 
request, the officer’s personnel file should be inspected by the trial judge in camera to 
determine whether information in the personnel file should be disclosed.
563
 Booth was 
charged with resisting arrest.
564
 He defended himself by arguing that the arresting officers 
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had fabricated a resisting-arrest charge to cover up their use of excessive force.
565
 Booth 
moved the district court to compel the State to produce the officers’ personnel files.566 
The trial judge rejected his motion, refused to inspect the files in camera, and Booth was 
convicted.
567
 The court of appeals determined that the type of information requested in 
Booth’s discovery motion, if found in the personnel files, would likely have been relevant 
to the Booth’s guilt or innocence.568 Furthermore, the court determined that Booth had 
presented a factual predicate for the request.
569
 Remanding for further proceedings, the 
court of appeals held that when a defendant (1) shows that information possibly 
contained in a police officer’s personnel file would be relevant to the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence and (2) presents a factual predicate for the discovery request, the officer’s 
personnel file should be inspected by the trial judge in camera to determine whether 
information in the personnel file should be disclosed.
570
 
 
Pomeroy v. State 
In Pomeroy v. State,
571
 the court of appeals held that, for the purposes of                     
Civil Rule 42(c)(1), a second post-conviction relief application is the same action as the 
first application, and a prisoner who waives his right to a peremptory challenge in the 
first application also waives his right to a peremptory challenge in the second 
application.
572
 Pomeroy filed an application for post-conviction relief which the superior 
court dismissed.
573
 Pomeroy filed a second application, which the same superior court 
judge also dismissed.
574
 Pomeroy appealed the dismissal, arguing that the judge should 
not have adjudicated the second application because Pomeroy had filed a peremptory 
challenge of the judge under Rule 42(c)(1). The court of appeals noted that, generally, a 
party has a right under Rule 42(c)(1) to peremptorily challenge a judge.
575
 But a party 
loses that right when new proceedings are collaterally related to previous proceedings in 
which the party had waived its right to a peremptory challenge.
576
 The court determined 
that the two post-conviction applications were collaterally related to each other, and that, 
in the first proceeding, Pomeroy had waived his right to peremptorily challenge the 
superior court judge.
577
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that, for the purposes of  
Rule 42(c)(1), a second post-conviction relief application is the same action as the first 
application, and a prisoner who waives his right to a peremptory challenge in the first 
application also waives his right to a peremptory challenge in the second application.
578
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Taylor v. State 
In Taylor v. State,
579
 the court of appeals held that, after a jury’s conviction, a presiding 
judge should only grant a new trial when the evidence is so one-sided that the jury’s 
contrary view is plainly unjust.
580
 Taylor was convicted of second-degree theft, which 
required the State to prove that he had stolen an item worth $500 or more.
581
 He argued 
that the evidence proving the value of the stolen item was so questionable that it 
warranted a new trial under Criminal Rule 33.
582
 The trial judge refused to grant a new 
trial and stated that, although he himself would have acquitted Taylor, enough evidence 
had been presented that the jury’s verdict could not be called unjust.583 The court of 
appeals noted that a simple disagreement with a jury’s verdict is not enough to warrant a 
new trial.
584
 The trial judge must instead determine that the jury’s view of the evidence is 
plainly unreasonable and unjust.
585
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that, after a jury’s 
conviction, the presiding judge should only grant a new trial when the evidence is so one-
sided that the jury’s contrary view is plainly unjust.586 
 
Reandeau v. State 
In Reandeau v. State,
587
 the court of appeals held that it does not have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a defendant’s excessive-sentence claim if the defendant’s time to serve is 
within the presumptive range.
588
 Reandeau was given a composite sentence of 52½ years 
with 25 years suspended.
589
 The presumptive sentence for his most serious offense was 
15–30 years’ imprisonment.590 He appealed the sentence, arguing that it was excessive.591 
The court of appeals noted that, by statute, it only has jurisdiction over sentence appeals 
when the defendant has been sentenced to more than two years of incarceration and when 
the sentence is outside the presumptive range.
592
 Reandeau argued that the court should 
take into account his 25-year suspended sentence in determining whether it had 
jurisdiction.
593
 After analyzing the legislative history of its jurisdictional statutes, the 
court determined that a defendant’s right to a sentence appeal is based on the defendant’s 
time to serve without reference to his suspended sentence.
594
 Referring Reandeau’s 
excessive-sentence claim to the supreme court for discretionary review, the court of 
appeals held that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a defendant’s excessive-
sentence claim if the defendant’s time to serve is within the presumptive range.595 
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Grove v. State 
In Grove v. State,
596
 the court of appeals held that a statute allowing agency employees, 
including employees of the Public Defender Agency, to practice law for ten months 
before getting a license did not violate state bar rules.
597
 Grove challenged his conviction 
because the public defender representing him did not have a license and had not been 
directly supervised as required by state bar rules.
598
 The court of appeals reasoned that 
the statute allowing employees of the Public Defender Agency to practice for ten months 
before getting a license did not violate state bar rules because the statute clearly served as 
an alternative to (rather than a contradiction of) current state bar rules.
599
 The court of 
appeals held that a statute allowing agency employees, including employees of the Public 
Defender Agency, to practice law for ten months before getting a license did not violate 
state bar rules.
600
 
 
Richards v. State 
In Richards v. State,
601
 the court of appeals held that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to 
review a composite sentence for excessiveness when it lacks jurisdiction to review any of 
the individual sentences that comprise the composite sentence.
602
 Richards was convicted 
of a felony and a misdemeanor; the superior court imposed a composite sentence of 18 
months for both convictions.
603
 Richards appealed, arguing that his sentence was 
excessive.
604
 The court of appeals noted that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to decide 
whether the misdemeanor sentence was excessive because Richards had received more 
than 120 days of imprisonment for the misdemeanor.
605
 But it did not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction to decide whether the felony sentence was excessive for two reasons: first, a 
defendant has no right to appeal a felony sentence unless the sentence to be served is 
more than two years; second, Richards’ sentence was within the presumptive sentence 
range for his offense.
606
 The court decided that it should not consider the misdemeanor 
sentence in isolation because many trial judges select a composite total amount of time 
for the defendant to serve, then impose individual sentences that add up to that total.
607
 
The court of appeals referred the excessiveness argument to the supreme court and held 
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review a composite sentence for excessiveness 
when it lacks jurisdiction to review any of the individual sentences that comprise the 
composite sentence.
608
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Gray v. State 
In Gray v. State,
609
 the court of appeals held that a statute that automatically waives 
juvenile jurisdiction for serious offenses does not violate a defendant’s right to equal 
protection under the Alaska Constitution.
610
 Gray, a 16 year-old, was sentenced as an 
adult to 65 years for an execution-style murder.
611
 She had been sentenced as an adult as 
a result of an automatic waiver statute which waives juvenile jurisdiction for certain 
serious crimes.
612
 On appeal, she argued that the automatic waiver statute violated her 
right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.
613
 The court of appeals applied a 
three-step analysis. First, it decided that Gray’s interest was the narrow interest of a 
convicted offender attempting to minimize her punishment.
614
 Second, it determined that 
the State has a strong interest in imposing punishment and in determining how its 
penalties should be applied to different classes of felons.
615
 Third, the waiver statute 
distinguishes minors by the seriousness of their crimes, a classification which bears a 
substantial relationship to the purposes of punishment.
616
 Affirming, the court of appeals 
held that a statute that automatically waives juvenile jurisdiction for serious offenses does 
not violate a defendant’s right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.617 
 
Sawyer v. State 
In Sawyer v. State,
618
 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant cannot compel 
the State to produce evidence of unrelated prior incidents unless those incidents have 
taken place under substantially similar circumstances.
619
 Sawyer was convicted of first-
degree murder for killing his wife, who was shot while lying in bed.
620
 At trial, Sawyer 
argued that either his wife had committed suicide or his three-year-old son had shot 
her.
621
 Sawyer filed a motion to compel the State to produce the results of state trooper 
investigations into incidents in which young children had fired weapons resulting in 
injury or death.
622
 The trial court denied the motion, finding it overbroad and wasteful of 
time and resources.
623
 On appeal, Sawyer argued that the trial court had committed 
reversible error because the reports would have contained relevant evidence favorable to 
the defense.
624
 The court of appeals reasoned that the prosecution should not be 
compelled to provide evidence that is not reasonably thought to be germane to the 
case.
625
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant cannot compel the 
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State to produce evidence of unrelated prior incidents unless those incidents have taken 
place under substantially similar circumstances.
626
 
 
Beattie v. State 
In Beattie v. State,
627
 the court of appeals held that a defendant waives his right against 
double jeopardy if a question is still pending but he does not object to the jury's 
dismissal.
628
 Beattie was tried for a felony driving under the influence charge, which 
required the State to prove two prior convictions.
629
 Beattie bifurcated his trial, separating 
the issue of his prior convictions, and failed to object when the jury was dismissed before 
hearing the evidence of his prior convictions.
630
 The court reasoned that, by failing to 
object, Beattie had waived his right against double jeopardy and authorized the court to 
call a second jury to hear the evidence of his prior convictions.
631
 The court of appeals 
held that a defendant waives his right against double jeopardy if a question is still 
pending but he does not object to the jury's dismissal.
 632
 
 
Shay v. State 
In Shay v. State,
633
 the court of appeals held that statements made to the police during 
questioning that occurs on the side of a road, where the individual being questioned is 
free to leave and has not been handcuffed, are admissible in court regardless of whether a 
Miranda warning has been given.
634
 Two police officers found Shay one mile away from 
an abandoned vehicle that had just sped away from a police stop at an unsafe speed.
635
 
The police questioned Shay without giving him a Miranda warning.
636
 Based on his 
statements, Shay was convicted of several crimes.
637
 On appeal, he argued that his 
statements should not have been admissible because, given the totality of the 
circumstances, he had reasonably believed that he was under arrest when the officers 
questioned him.
638
 The court of appeals reasoned that this was a routine investigatory 
stop rather than a custodial interrogation (which would have entitled Shay to a Miranda 
warning) because the questioning took place on the side of a public road, with only two 
officers present, under circumstances that did not have the coercive atmosphere of a 
police station.
639
 Additionally, the court of appeals noted that the officers had not asked 
accusatory questions, had not confronted Shay with incriminating evidence, and had not 
pressured Shay in any way.
640
 The court of appeals held that statements made to the 
police during questioning that occurs on the side of a road, where the individual being 
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questioned is free to leave and has not been handcuffed, are admissible in court 
regardless of whether a Miranda warning has been given.
641
 
 
Burnett v. State 
In Burnett v. State,
642
 the court of appeals held that a driver’s act of unnecessarily 
spinning his vehicle's tires, without more, does not establish reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the driver is driving negligently.
643
 At around midnight, a state trooper 
observed Burnett’s vehicle stopped at an intersection.644 Burnett then “peeled out” and, 
although Burnett made no other driving errors, the trooper initiated a traffic stop 
suspecting that Burnett was driving while intoxicated.
645
 Burnett submitted to a breath 
test and was arrested based on the test results.
646
 He moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the stop had not been supported by 
reasonable suspicion to believe he had engaged in wrongdoing.
647
 The district court 
denied the motion, holding that the trooper had probable cause to believe that Burnett had 
committed the offense of driving negligently, and Burnett was convicted.
648
 The court of 
appeals noted that the State had offered no evidence to suggest that Burnett’s driving had 
created an actual danger to persons or property; therefore, there could have been no 
reasonable suspicion that Burnett had engaged in negligent driving.
649
 Likewise, the facts 
could not have created more than a hunch that Burnett had been driving while 
impaired.
650
 In addition, the court dismissed the community caretaker theory offered by 
the State because the trooper had failed to testify that he had believed it necessary to 
intervene to prevent harm to Burnett or the public.
651
 Reversing, the court of appeals held 
that a driver’s act of unnecessarily spinning his vehicle's tires, without more, 
does not establish reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver is driving negligently.
652
 
 
Ray v. State 
In Ray v. State,
653
 the court of appeals held that a sentencing court does not have the 
power, in the absence of express statutory authority, to require a defendant to register as a 
sex offender as a condition of his probation.
654
 Ray was convicted of sexual assault in 
1994, before the legislature enacted a statute requiring convicted sex offenders to register 
with the State as sex offenders.
655
 Ray was released on probation and contacted a member 
of the victim’s family.656 The superior court found that Ray had violated his probation 
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and ordered that, upon Ray’s release, he would have to register as a sex offender under 
the sex offender statute.
657
 Upon review, the court of appeals noted that sentencing courts 
must have explicit legislative authorization before imposing conditions of probation that 
fundamentally alter the nature of probation.
658
 The court also referred to a supreme court 
decision stating that sex offender registration imposes significant and intrusive 
obligations upon a defendant.
659
 Thus, the court concluded that sex offender registration 
was a serious consequence of conviction and could not be imposed without statutory 
authority.
660
  Reversing, the court of appeals held that a sentencing court does not have 
the power, in the absence of express statutory authority, to require a defendant to register 
as a sex offender as a condition of his probation.
661
 
 
Sikeo v. State 
In Sikeo v. State,
662
 the court of appeals held that a presumptive 99-year sentence for a 
defendant who is convicted of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, and who has two 
prior convictions for sexual felonies, is not cruel and unusual.
663
 Sikeo was convicted of 
first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.
664
 Because of his two prior convictions for second-
degree sexual abuse of a minor, Sikeo faced a 99-year presumptive sentence.
665
 He 
received the presumptive sentence and appealed, arguing that the presumptive sentence 
was cruel and unusual.
666
 The court of appeals reasoned that, compared to the mandatory 
99-year sentence for defendants convicted of a class A or unclassified felony, who also 
have two prior, similar convictions, the presumptive term for sexual felons is not cruel 
and unusual.
667
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a presumptive 99-year sentence 
for a defendant who is convicted of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, and who has 
two prior convictions for sexual felonies, is not cruel and unusual.
668
 
 
Pierce v. State 
In Pierce v. State,
669
 the court of appeals held that, to preserve an issue for appeal, a party 
must first provide case-specific legal and factual analysis to the trial court, and the trial 
judge must rule upon the issue.
670
 Pierce was charged with robbery, theft, and assault.
671
 
At a pretrial hearing, Pierce asserted that a witness’s identification of him was 
impermissibly unreliable and should be excluded.
672
  However, when it came time to 
explain why the testimony should be excluded, Pierce’s attorney did not provide a factual 
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or legal analysis of the issue.
673
 Pierce’s attorney filed a motion that told the superior 
court that she intended to seek suppression of the witness’s identification, but the motion 
contained no discussion of the facts or the legal tests for suppressing witness 
identification.
674
 The trial court never ruled on the motion.
675
 For these reasons, the court 
of appeals determined that the issue had not been properly raised in the superior court.
 676
  
The court of appeals held that, to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must first provide 
case-specific legal and factual analysis to the trial court, and the trial judge must rule 
upon the issue.
677
 
 
Fletcher v. State 
In Fletcher v. State,
678
 the court of appeals held that a minor waives her right to contest 
her juvenile waiver proceeding when she enters a plea of no contest.
679
 After concluding 
that Fletcher, who faced murder charges, would be unamenable to treatment, the superior 
court waived juvenile jurisdiction over her.
680
 Fletcher then pled no contest to her 
charges.
681
 Decades later, she filed an application for post-conviction relief alleging that 
new developments in juvenile brain research could have convinced the trial court to deny 
the State’s motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction.682 The court of appeals affirmed the 
superior court’s order dismissing her application, reasoning that jurisdiction over a minor 
is more akin to personal jurisdiction than to subject-matter jurisdiction because the 
superior court has jurisdiction over both juvenile and adult felony prosecutions.
683
 
Entering a plea of guilty or no contest waives certain defects of previous proceedings, 
including personal jurisdiction.
684
 The court of appeals held that a minor waives her right 
to contest her juvenile waiver proceeding when she enters a plea of no contest.
685
 
 
Carney v. State 
In Carney v. State,
686
 the court of appeals held that a suspect’s confession to police 
officers can be voluntary, even if the officers promise not to arrest the confessor in return 
for the confession, so long as the confessor does not actually believe the officers.
687
 
Officers asked Carney, who had substantial experience with the criminal justice system, 
to come to the police station so they could interview him about a recent murder.
688
 
Throughout Carney’s confession, police officers stated that he would not be arrested that 
day; but Carney, who seemed to assume that his arrest was imminent, informed one of 
                                                 
673
 Id. at 433. 
674
 Id. at 432. 
675
 Id. 
676
 Id. at 435. 
677
 Id.  
678
 258 P.3d 875 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011). 
679
 Id. at 878. 
680
 Id. at 876. 
681
 Id. 
682
 Id. 
683
 Id. at 878. 
684
 Id. at 876–77. 
685
 Id. at 878. 
686
 249 P.3d 308 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011). 
687
 Id. at 313. 
688
 Id. at 309. 
48 
 
the officers that, if he should be arrested, he wanted that particular officer to arrest him.
689
 
Carney stated that prior to his arrest, he could not sleep because he anticipated being 
arrested, and he did not object when the officers came to arrest him.
690
 At trial, Carney 
moved to suppress his confession, arguing that it had been made involuntarily.
691
 The 
trial court denied his motion and Carney appealed.
692
 The court of appeals reasoned that 
Carney’s confession had not been influenced by the officers’ promises.693 The court 
determined that Carney had not believed that the officers had offered him immunity in 
exchange for his statement.
694
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a suspect’s 
confession to police can be voluntary, even if the officers promise not to arrest the 
suspect in return for his confession, so long as the suspect does not actually believe the 
officers.
695
 
 
State v. Amend 
In State v. Amend,
696
 the court of appeals held that a single validly-obtained Miranda 
waiver is sufficient to make a suspect’s statements admissible in court, even if the police 
change the subject matter of the questioning.
697
 Amend was arrested for shoplifting and 
advised of his Miranda rights.
698
  During the arrest, Amend agreed to a search of his 
pockets, in which the police officer found OxyContin tablets.
699
  Amend then made 
several incriminating statements about selling OxyContin.
700
 The superior court held that 
Amend’s statements about the OxyContin to the police officer had to be suppressed 
because the officer had failed to remind Amend of his Miranda rights.
701
 The court of 
appeals reasoned that the U.S. Constitution did not require suppression of the statements 
and that Amend’s case presented no compelling reasons to require a stricter waiver 
process under the Alaska Constitution.
702
 Reversing, the court of appeals held that a 
single validly-obtained Miranda waiver is sufficient to make a suspect’s statements 
admissible in court, even if the police change the subject matter of the questioning.
703
 
 
State v. Cook 
In State v. Cook,
704
 the court of appeals held that when, as the result of a mistake, a court 
in a civil case freezes the assets of a defendant who is also facing a criminal trial, that 
mistake does not violate the defendant’s right to the counsel of his choice.705 Cook was 
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prosecuted for murder and was simultaneously sued for wrongful death.
706
 Cook did not 
respond to the civil suit; as a result, the superior court entered a default judgment against 
him and froze his assets.
707
 When Cook finally responded to the civil suit, the superior 
court refused to set aside the judgment.
708
 Because his assets were frozen at the time of 
his criminal trial, he was unable to obtain the lawyer of his choice and was instead 
represented by the Public Defender Agency.
709
 He was convicted of murder.
710
 Later, the 
supreme court held that the superior court should have granted Cook’s request to set aside 
the default in his civil case.
711
 Cook petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that, 
because the superior court’s error had prevented him from obtaining the counsel of his 
choice, he was entitled to a new trial.
712
 The petition was granted, and the State 
appealed.
713
 The court of appeals questioned whether the superior court’s mistake should 
be viewed as a wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, Cook’s right to hire the 
defense counsel of his choice.
714
 The court noted that there would not have even been an 
argument of a Sixth Amendment violation if the supreme court had determined that the 
superior court had properly refused to reopen the civil case.
715
 The court then reasoned 
that, under Cook’s theory, any criminal conviction could be overturned whenever the 
defendant faced a simultaneous civil suit in which a court committed procedural error.
716
 
Reversing, the court of appeals held that when, as the result of a mistake, a court in a civil 
case freezes the assets of a defendant who is also facing a criminal trial, that mistake does 
not violate the defendant’s right to the counsel of his choice.717 
 
Olson v. State 
In Olson v. State,
718
 the court of appeals held that a Miranda waiver can be valid when 
the suspect acknowledges that he understands his Miranda rights and immediately 
volunteers information, including information that has not been requested.
719
 Olson was 
arrested for domestic violence.
720
 In the squad car, the officer advised Olson of his 
Miranda rights and Olson acknowledged that he understood those rights.
721
 He made 
several incriminating statements—some of which were not in response to questioning—
and then invoked his right to silence.
722
 The superior court held that he had knowingly 
waived his right to silence and that the statements were therefore admissible.
723
 On 
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appeal, Olson argued that he had not voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights.
724
 
The court of appeals acknowledged that, under federal law, a suspect waives his Miranda 
rights if he makes an uncoerced statement to the police.
725
 But the court did not have to 
decide whether Alaska would adopt the federal standard because the totality of the 
circumstances supported a finding that Olson understood his rights and voluntarily 
waived them.
726
 The court of appeals held that a Miranda waiver can be valid when the 
suspect acknowledges that he understands his Miranda rights and immediately volunteers 
information, including information that has not been requested.
727
 
 
Anderson v. State 
In Anderson v. State,
728
 the court of appeals held that an individual can validly consent to 
provide blood and urine samples, even when an officer has erroneously told him that he 
must provide the samples, so long as he has consulted with his attorney.
729
 After hitting 
and killing a pedestrian with his car, police told Anderson that he was required by law to 
provide blood and urine samples.
730
  Anderson discussed the matter with his attorney and 
eventually provided the samples.
731
 Anderson filed a motion to suppress the results of the 
samples, arguing that he had not had a meaningful conversation with his attorney; his 
motion was denied and he was convicted of driving under the influence.
732
 The court of 
appeals reasoned that Anderson’s consent was voluntary because he had discussed the 
issue with his lawyer and because he had been given forty minutes to reflect on the 
decision prior to his consent.
733
 The court noted that, although the detaining officer had 
incorrectly asserted that the samples were required, the misrepresentation was not 
intentional.
734
  And because Anderson refused to provide the samples until he had 
consulted with his lawyer, the court concluded that Anderson’s consent was not tainted 
by the officer’s incorrect assertion of authority.735 Affirming, the court of appeals held 
that an individual can validly consent to provide blood and urine samples, even when an 
officer has erroneously told him that he must provide the samples, so long as he has 
consulted with his attorney.
736
 
 
Nook v. State 
In Nook v. State,
737
 the court of appeals held that a convicted defendant whose lawyer is 
retroactively transferred to inactive status must show that he was unfairly prejudiced by 
his lawyer’s representation to prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim.738  In 1999, 
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Nook was found guilty of second-degree murder.
739
  In 2003, the supreme court 
transferred his counsel to inactive disability status.
740
  The inactive status extended 
retroactively to 1998, prior to Nook’s trial.741 Nook then filed an application for post-
conviction relief, arguing that, because Sidell was technically inactive during his 
representation of Nook, Nook had been denied his right to effective assistance of 
counsel.
742
 The superior court denied the application.
743
 The court of appeals reasoned 
that, absent a situation where an attorney knows at the time of representation that he is 
barred from representing clients, his client must still prove specific acts of attorney 
incompetence and resulting prejudice to win an ineffective-assistance claim.
744
 To hold 
otherwise would permit Nook to obtain a new trial when, at the time of his original trial, 
even the most probing inquiry would not have revealed any defect in his lawyer’s ability 
to practice law.
745
 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that a convicted defendant 
whose lawyer is retroactively transferred to inactive status must show that he was 
unfairly prejudiced by his lawyer’s representation to prevail on an ineffective-assistance 
claim.
746
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Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Cameron v. Chang-Craft 
In Cameron v. Chang-Craft,
747
 the supreme court held that a jury can reasonably find that 
a union breaches its duty of fair representation when a former employee’s wrongful-
termination grievance has merit but the union withdraws from arbitration without 
explanation.
748
 Chang-Craft asked her union to reconsider her wrongful termination 
grievance against her employer because she had no previous disciplinary issues with her 
employer, the allegations against her were exaggerated and taken out of context, and she 
had been denied a union representative at the investigatory meeting.
749
 The union did not 
respond and offered no reason for its decision not to proceed with the grievance.
750
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Chang-Craft sued and a jury found that the union had violated its duty of fair 
representation by arbitrary refusing to represent her.
751
 On appeal, the supreme court 
reasoned that, because Chang-Craft had a meritorious argument, and because the union 
had failed to provide any explanation for its failure to pursue her claim, the evidence was 
sufficient for a jury to conclude that its decision was arbitrary.
752
 Affirming, the supreme 
court held that a jury can reasonably find that a union breaches its duty of fair 
representation when a former employee’s wrongful-termination grievance has merit but 
the union withdraws from arbitration without explanation.
753
 
 
State v. Public Safety Employees Ass’n 
In State v. Public Safety Employees Ass’n,754 the supreme court announced that it is 
improper for a court to enforce an arbitration decision that violates an explicit, well-
defined, and dominant public policy.
755
  The Public Safety Employees Association filed a 
grievance on behalf of a state trooper who had been dismissed in part for dishonesty 
during training exercises.
 756
  The trooper had been told that his dishonesty would result 
in nothing more than a minor suspension, but his termination letter focused on that 
dishonesty.
757
  Since the other incidents reported in the termination letter did not 
constitute a pattern of dishonesty, the arbitrator determined that the State lacked just 
cause for the termination and reinstated the trooper.
758
  The superior court upheld the 
arbitration award and the State appealed.
759
  Noting that other jurisdictions have 
recognized the public-policy exception to the enforcement of arbitration awards, the 
supreme court adopted such an exception for awards that would violate an explicit, well- 
defined, and dominant public policy in Alaska.
760
  The court nevertheless upheld the 
arbitrator’s reinstatement of the trooper because the State was unable to identify a source 
that clearly set out a public policy regarding the reinstatement of a trooper who has been 
dishonest.
761
 Thus, the Court upheld the arbitration award but announced that it is 
improper for a court to enforce an arbitration decision that violates an explicit, well- 
defined, and dominant public policy.
762
 
 
Hoendermis v. Advanced Physical Therapy 
In Hoendermis v. Advanced Physical Therapy,
763
 the supreme court held that the denial 
of an unemployment benefits claim does not collaterally estop an employee from suing 
her former employer for wrongful termination.
764
 Hoendermis was an employee of 
Advanced Physical Therapy (APT) until she was fired for poor interaction with other 
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employees.
765
 Hoendermis applied for unemployment benefits, but her claim was denied 
because she had been terminated for misconduct.
766
 She then sued APT for wrongful 
termination.
767
 The trial court granted APT’s motion for summary judgment, holding that 
the agency’s determination collaterally estopped Hoendermis from suing APT.768 On 
appeal, the supreme court reasoned that, although agency decisions can sometimes 
collaterally estop claims, here the agency’s decision was related only to Hoendermis’ 
eligibility for benefits and not to the culpability of her former employer.
769
 Reversing, the 
supreme court held that the denial of an unemployment benefits claim does not 
collaterally estop an employee from suing her former employer for wrongful 
termination.
770
 
 
Crowley v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Crowley v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
771
 the supreme court held 
that, to prove a breach of the subjective component of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, a terminated employee must show that her employer acted in bad 
faith.
772
 Crowley was discharged from employment after an internal investigation 
revealed numerous instances of incompetence and poor judgment.
773
 Crowley sued, 
alleging wrongful termination under the theory that her employer had violated the 
subjective component of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
774
 The 
superior court dismissed the case, and Crowley appealed.
775
 The supreme court noted that 
the only evidence Crowley had presented to prove that the internal investigation had been 
conducted in bad faith was her own speculation.
776
 And even if Crowley could have 
proven that her employer had been mistaken as to the underlying facts leading to her 
termination, such proof would not have shown that her employer had acted in bad 
faith.
777
 Affirming, the supreme court held that, to prove a breach of the subjective 
component of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a terminated employee 
must show that her employer acted in bad faith.
778
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. Federal Highway Administration 
In Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. Federal Highway Administration,
779
 the 
Ninth Circuit held that an agency violates the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) when its environmental impact statement fails to adequately address a 
reasonable alternative to a proposed project.
780
 The Alaska Department of Transportation, 
in connection with the Federal Highway Administration,  initiated a project to improve 
the surface access from Juneau to Haines and Skagway.
781
 The Highway Administration 
released for public comment a draft environmental impact statement in which it 
announced that its preferred method of improving surface access was to build a new 
highway and a new ferry terminal.
782
 In a comment letter, the Southeast Alaska 
Conservation Council (Council) asserted that the draft impact statement violated NEPA 
because it did not consider that surface access could be improved by improving the ferry 
systems already in place in the Lynn Canal corridor.
783
 The Highway Administration 
issued a final impact statement in which it rejected the Council’s suggestion, stating 
simply that it could not increase ferry service there without reducing service elsewhere 
and without increasing costs.
784
 The Council sought an injunction in the district court.
785
 
The district court held that the Highway Administration violated NEPA when, in its 
impact statement, it arbitrarily refused to consider a reasonable alternative to its 
project.
786
 In so holding, the district court enjoined any construction on the project.
787
 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that, under NEPA, an agency must objectively evaluate 
any reasonable alternatives to a proposed action.
788
 The Highway Administration had 
failed to adequately consider the Council’s alternative under NEPA.789 Further, the 
Highway Administration’s reason for dismissing the Council’s argument—that the 
Council’s plan would take ferry service away from other areas and that it would increase 
costs—was arbitrary, because the Highway Administration’s adopted plan would create 
the same problems.
790
 Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that an agency violates NEPA 
when its environmental impact statement fails to adequately address a reasonable 
alternative to a proposed project.
791
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United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
 
Organized Village of Kake v. U.S. Department of Agriculture 
In Organized Village of Kake v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,
792
 the federal district 
court held that the promulgation of the Forest Service rule exempting the Tongass 
National Forest from the Roadless Area Conservation Rule was arbitrary and 
capricious.
793
 The Forest Service gave three reasons for its promulgation of a rule 
temporarily exempting the Tongass from the Roadless Rule: (1) the long-term 
socioeconomic costs to local communities of applying the Roadless Rule to the Tongass 
would be too great; (2) the Tongass Forest Plan sufficiently protected the roadless values 
on the Tongass; and (3) the temporary exemption would provide legal certainty in light of 
numerous lawsuits regarding the Roadless Rule.
794
 Individuals who used and relied on 
the Tongass roadless area challenged the rule.
795
 The court analyzed whether the reasons 
offered by the Forest Service for the exemption provided a rational basis for the 
temporary exemption.
796
 First, the court reasoned that it was implausible to use long-term 
socioeconomic projections to justify a short-term exemption; moreover, the Forest 
Service had not offered any evidence showing actual job losses resulting from the 
application of the Roadless Rule.
797
 Second, the court noted that the Forest Service had 
flipped positions—without explanation—by first maintaining that the Forest Plan did not 
provide enough protection to the Tongass, then maintaining that it did.
798
 Furthermore, 
the Ninth Circuit had already stated that the Roadless Rule provided greater protection to 
roadless areas than did the forest plans.
799
 Finally, the court reasoned that it was 
implausible that a temporary exemption, during which the Forest Service would engage 
in further rulemaking, could provide any legal certainty.
800
 Reinstating the Roadless Rule, 
the federal district court held that the promulgation of the Forest Service rule exempting 
the Tongass National Forest from the Roadless Area Conservation Rule was arbitrary and 
capricious.
801
 
 
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
top  
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
State v. Dussault 
In State v. Dussault,
802
 the court of appeals held that a judge who has significant ex parte 
communications about a case, without express legal authorization and without 
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immediately notifying the missing parties, must be disqualified from the case.
803
 Dussault 
was civilly committed after being acquitted of first-degree murder by reason of 
insanity.
804
 During conditional-release hearings, the superior court judge had numerous 
ex parte conversations with Department of Health and Social Services officials in an 
attempt to gain conditional release for Dussault.
805
 The State moved to disqualify the 
judge; when the judge denied the State’s motion, the State appealed.806 The court of 
appeals noted that the ex parte conversations had not been expressly authorized by law, 
nor had they been required for administrative purposes.
807
 Furthermore, the court noted 
that the superior court judge failed to immediately notify the missing parties of his ex 
parte communications.
808
 Under these circumstances, the court determined that the ex 
parte communications created an appearance of partiality and that the superior court 
judge had to be disqualified from the case.
809
 Reversing, the court of appeals held that a 
judge who has significant ex parte communications about a case, without express legal 
authorization and without immediately notifying the missing parties, must be disqualified 
from the case.
810
 
 
FAMILY LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess 
In Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess,
811
 the supreme court held that, during a child’s minority, 
the statute of limitations for child support is tolled.
812
  The parents had a son in 1991.
813
 
The father failed to financially support the child until 1997.
814
 During divorce 
proceedings, the superior court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the mother’s 
claim for pre-1997 child support.
815
 The supreme court affirmed because (1) the statute of 
limitations in Alaska expires ten years after the cause of action; (2) when a claim belongs 
to a child, the time that the child is under the age of majority does not count against the 
statute of limitations; and (3) in Alaska, the right to child support is the child’s right.816  
Affirming, the supreme court held that, during a child’s minority, the statute of 
limitations for child support is tolled.
817
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Darcy F. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Darcy F. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
818
 the supreme court held 
that not every possible active effort must be provided by the Office of Children’s 
Services (OCS) to a parent before parental rights can be terminated.
819
 Darcy had a 
history of severe chronic pain and other medical problems that led to substance abuse.
820
 
The superior court terminated Darcy’s parental rights to her daughter because she was not 
capable of meeting the child’s needs.821 On appeal, Darcy argued that the State had made 
insufficient efforts to address the medical conditions underlying her substance abuse.
822
  
The supreme court reasoned that OCS had done enough, even if there was more that OCS 
could have done.
823
 The court noted that active efforts made by OCS included:              
(1) developing a case plan for Darcy that identified specific concerns, and offering 
services to address those concerns; (2) repeatedly following up on Darcy’s case plan;                  
(3) numerous efforts to arrange for substance abuse assessments, drug tests, and 
treatments; and (4) continued monitoring of Darcy’s progress up to the beginning of the 
hearings.
824
  Affirming, the supreme court held that not every possible active effort must 
be provided by OCS to a parent before parental rights can be terminated.
825
 
 
Christina J. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Christina J. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
826
 the supreme court 
held that when a child is taken by the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) soon after 
birth, termination of parental rights may occur earlier than usual due to the importance of 
bonding and permanence for young children.
827
 Christina appealed from the termination 
of her parental rights to her son.
828
 Her son had been exposed to substance abuse, 
domestic violence, and his parents’ mental health instability.829 OCS took custody of him 
four months after his birth and petitioned for the termination of parental rights nine 
months after his birth.
830
 The lower court upheld the termination of parental rights, 
finding that Christina had done virtually nothing to remedy her behavior.
831
 The supreme 
court affirmed, holding that the child’s young age and the slow pace of Christina’s 
attempted recovery were significant factors when determining whether to terminate 
parental rights.
832
 The court noted that, because of the child’s young age, it was important 
for OCS to find a permanent, stable family for him so that he could appropriately bond 
with a parental figure.
833
 Affirming, the supreme court held that when a child is taken by 
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OCS soon after birth, termination of parental rights may occur earlier than usual due to 
the importance of bonding and permanence for young children.
834
 
 
William P. v. Taunya P. 
In William P. v. Taunya P.,
835
 the supreme court held that a trial court does not abuse its 
discretion by limiting a father’s visitation rights due to the father’s denigrating the mother 
in front of their children.
836
 William and Taunya were a divorced couple with two sons.
837
 
Taunya moved out of state, requiring modification of the couple’s child custody 
arrangement.
838
 The trial court granted sole custody to Taunya and shortened William’s 
visitation rights to one week at Christmas and six weeks during the summer.
839
 William 
appealed the order, arguing that the reduction was unwarranted given that the experts in 
the case recommended no reduction in visitation.
840
 The supreme court reasoned that 
William had harmed the boys’ relationship with their mother by repeatedly denigrating 
Taunya in front of them. The court also noted that the superior court would revisit the 
issue if William later ceased such denigration.
841
 The court emphasized that one factor— 
the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and 
continuing relationship between the other parent and the children—is the most important 
factor when parents reside at a great distance apart.
842
 Affirming, the supreme court held 
that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by limiting a father’s visitation rights due to 
the father’s denigrating the mother in front of their children.843   
 
Bagby v. Bagby 
In Bagby v. Bagby,
844
 the supreme court held that a father’s relocation with his child out 
of state constitutes a substantial change in circumstances warranting a determination of 
whether modification of the child custody agreement would better serve the child’s best 
interests, even if the parents had previously lived far apart within Alaska.
845
 The superior 
court denied the mother’s motion to modify custody after the father, who had primary 
custody, moved with their daughter to Arizona.
846
 The superior court found that the 
father’s move to Arizona did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances because 
the original custody order had included long-distance travel between Sitka and 
Anchorage.
847
 After examining state precedent and evaluating the considerable obstacles 
involved in interstate traveling, the supreme court reversed and held that a father’s 
relocation with his child out of state constitutes a substantial change in circumstances 
warranting a determination of whether modification of the child custody agreement 
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would better serve the child’s best interests, even if the parents had previously lived far 
apart within Alaska.
848
 
 
Ralph H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Ralph H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
849
 the supreme court held 
that a parent’s compliance with a treatment program does not guarantee that parental 
rights will not be terminated.
850
 Ralph attended a family violence intervention program 
but later threatened to kill a social worker if his son, Rex, was not returned to him.
851
 The 
superior court found that Ralph had not remedied the conduct or condition that made Rex 
a child in need of aid.
852
 On appeal, Ralph argued that he had substantially complied with 
his treatment plan and, thus, Rex was not a child in need of aid.
853
 The supreme court 
noted that a treatment program does not guarantee that adequate parenting skills will be 
acquired by completing the program.
854
 Further, sufficient evidence existed in the record 
to support the superior court’s finding that Ralph had not remedied the conduct and 
conditions that had placed Rex at a substantial risk of harm.
855
 Affirming, the supreme 
court held that a parent’s compliance with a treatment program does not guarantee that 
parental rights will not be terminated.
856
 
 
Yvonne S. v. Wesley H. 
In Yvonne S. v. Wesley H.,
857
 the supreme court held that a marked drop in a child’s 
academic performance does not necessarily demonstrate a change of circumstances 
warranting modification of a custody arrangement.
858
 Yvonne and Wesley divorced and 
Wesley was given primary physical custody of their daughter.
859
 Two years later, Yvonne 
moved for a hearing for shared physical custody because their daughter’s grades had 
deteriorated during the time that she lived primarily with Wesley.
860
 The lower court 
denied the motion, stating that Yvonne had not demonstrated a substantial change in 
circumstances.
861
 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that although the daughter’s 
grades had dropped markedly, the drop could be attributed to numerous causes (such as 
harder classes).
862
 The court also noted that the daughter strongly preferred to live with 
Wesley.
863
 The supreme court affirmed and held that a marked drop in a child’s academic 
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performance does not necessarily demonstrate a change of circumstances warranting 
modification of a custody arrangement.
864
    
 
Ralph H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Ralph H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
865
 the supreme court held 
that, when parental rights have been terminated, post-termination visitation rights should 
not be granted if visitation is not in the best interest of the child.
866
 The superior court 
terminated Ralph’s parental rights after a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceeding.867 
Ralph then moved for post-termination visitation privileges with his child and, at a 
hearing, a doctor testified that it would be in the child’s best interest to continue a 
relationship with Ralph.
868
 The superior court denied Ralph’s motion without prejudice, 
finding that Ralph had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that granting him 
visitation rights would be in his child’s best interest.869 On appeal, the supreme court first 
noted that a termination of parental rights results in automatic cessation of visitation and 
that no CINA statute expressly grants a superior court the authority to order post-
termination visitation rights.
870
 But, the supreme court noted, the possibility of post-
termination visitation is not completely foreclosed; extraordinary circumstances might 
permit a superior court to order such visitation, if visitation would be in the best interest 
of the child.
871
 After reviewing the record, the supreme court determined that the superior 
court had not clearly erred in its denial of post-termination visitation rights.
872
 First, the 
supreme court reasoned that the child would benefit from a sense of permanency that 
could only be achieved through adoption.
873
  Second, it noted that conflicting evidence 
had been presented to the superior court as to whether visitation would be beneficial or 
harmful to the child.
874
 The supreme court thus held that, when parental rights have been 
terminated, post-termination visitation rights should not be granted if visitation is not in 
the best interest of the child.
875
 
 
McAlpine v. Pacarro 
In McAlpine v. Pacarro,
876
 the supreme court held that, although res judicata does not 
apply to custody disputes, collateral estoppel may bar a litigant from twice arguing that 
prior domestic violence should influence a custody decision.
877
 McAlpine and Pacarro 
divorced and McAlpine moved for a long-term domestic violence protective order against 
Pacarro.
878
 The superior court found that there was no evidence of domestic violence.
879
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Two years later, McAlpine sought to obtain custody of their children and again asserted 
that Pacarro’s prior domestic violence should influence the custody decision.880 The 
superior court denied her motion without a hearing, holding that the motion was barred 
by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
881
 On appeal, the supreme court noted that res 
judicata does not apply to custody modifications.
882
 A change in circumstances must 
normally be demonstrated to obtain a custody modification, but that rule is relaxed when 
domestic violence is an issue—especially if the custody agreement was made by pro se 
parties with a history of domestic violence.
883
 The court reasoned, however, that the 
superior court judge had discretion to apply collateral estoppel to bar McAlpine’s claim 
because: (1) she was a party to the first action, (2) the issue that she raised was identical 
to the issue already decided, (3) a final judgment on the merits had been issued, and      
(4) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment.
884
 Because the 
superior court did not discuss whether it would be fair to apply collateral estoppel to 
McAlpine’s claim, the supreme court remanded and held that, although res judicata does 
not apply to custody disputes, collateral estoppel may bar a litigant from twice arguing 
that prior domestic violence should influence a custody decision.
885
 
 
Nelson v. Nelson 
In Nelson v. Nelson,
886
 the supreme court held that a move out of state constitutes a 
change of circumstances sufficient to modify a custody agreement, even when the parties 
had agreed upon a custody arrangement if one of the parents moved out of the state.
887
 
When Justin and Erica divorced, they agreed that, if one of them moved out of their 
community, their children would remain with the non-moving parent until both parents 
created a parenting agreement for the different communities.
888
 Both parents later 
contemplated moving out of state and both parents moved for primary custody, arguing 
that moving out of state would constitute a change of circumstances.
889
 The superior 
court held that there had been no unanticipated change of circumstances because both 
parents had contemplated moving out of state at the time of their original custody 
agreement.
890
 Justin appealed, arguing that his anticipated move constituted a change of 
circumstances.
891
 The supreme court reasoned that an anticipated move satisfies the 
change-of-circumstances requirement and that to hold otherwise could result in a custody 
award to an unfit parent solely because that parent had not moved away.
892
 The existing 
custody agreement could be taken into account by the superior court, but the superior 
court could not enforce the agreement unless the court agreed that the terms of the 
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agreement were also in the best interest of the child.
893
 The supreme court held that a 
move out of state constitutes a change of circumstances sufficient to modify a custody 
agreement, even when the parties had agreed upon a custody arrangement if one of the 
parents moved out of the state.
894
 
 
Sarah G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Sarah G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
895
 the supreme court held 
that a parent’s tendency to expose her children to an environment filled with domestic 
violence can be used to support a judgment that her child is in need of aid.
896
 The Office 
of Children’s Services (OCS) removed Sarah’s children after receiving reports that 
Sarah’s boyfriend had assaulted her in the home and that her children did not feel safe 
there.
897
 The superior court determined that the children were in need of aid due to their 
mental injury and substance abuse, as well as their mother’s mental illness and her failure 
to provide them with treatment and supervision.
898
 In so holding, the superior court found 
that Sarah had a “continued tendency” to enter physically abusive relationships, thus 
creating a substantial risk of mental injury to her children.
899
 On appeal, Sarah argued 
that the court’s finding would compel the conclusion that any woman who fails to sever 
contact with an abusive partner would show a “continued tendency” to enter abusive 
relationships.
900
 The supreme court noted that no evidence at trial supported a finding that 
Sarah had ever had a nonviolent relationship.
901
 The court reasoned that, because the 
children had lived their lives in the shadow of domestic violence, Sarah had exposed 
them to a substantial risk of mental injury.
902
 Affirming, the supreme court held that a 
parent’s tendency to expose her children to an environment filled with domestic violence 
can be used to support a judgment that her child is in need of aid.
903
 
 
INSURANCE LAW 
top  
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Herron 
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Herron,
904
 the Ninth Circuit held that the failure of an insurer 
to determine by a date certain whether the insured’s liability exceeds his policy limit does 
not necessarily result in a violation of the Alaska covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
even when the insurer has the ability to do so.
905
 Herron was involved in a car accident in 
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which his passenger was injured.
906
 The passenger’s lawyer contacted Allstate and stated 
that it would revoke an offer to settle at policy limits by May 16, 2003.
907
 On that day, 
Allstate stated that it was still investigating the accident and would respond to the 
settlement offer by the end of May.
908
 On May 30, Allstate offered to settle for the policy 
limit, but the offer was rejected because Allstate had not met the May 16 deadline.
909
 
Allstate sought a declaratory judgment that its attempt to settle satisfied its obligation to 
Herron and that it would not be obligated to pay any amount exceeding the policy 
limit.
910
 The parties stipulated that Allstate could have determined that Herron’s liability 
exceeded his policy limits by May 16, but a jury found that Allstate had acted 
reasonably.
911
 Herron appealed, arguing that the Alaska covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing required Allstate to settle by May 16.
912
 Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Allstate, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was not clear that Allstate had 
unreasonably failed to settle by May 16.
913
 The court noted that, although the parties had 
stipulated that Allstate could have determined Herron’s liability by May 16, the question 
before the jury was whether Allstate should have settled by then.
914
 Affirming, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the failure of an insurer to determine by a date certain whether the 
insured’s liability exceeds his policy limit does not necessarily result in a violation of the 
Alaska covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even when the insurer has the ability to 
do so.
915
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
State, Department of Commerce v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. 
In State, Department of Commerce  v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,
916
 the supreme court 
held that a non-construction, owner-controlled insurance program is not barred by        
AS 21.36.065.
917
 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company contracted with Liberty Mutual to 
write an owner-controlled insurance program.
918
 The contractors enrolled in that program 
engaged in maintenance and support, not construction.
919
 The State issued a cease-and-
desist order, claiming that the owner-controlled insurance program violated                   
AS 21.36.065.
920
 The superior court held that the company had not violated the statute.
921
  
On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that the definitions provided in AS 21.36.065(c) 
clearly restrict AS 21.36.065 to insurance programs that are procured on behalf of a 
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person who, in the course of the person’s business, engages the service of a contractor for 
the purpose of working on a construction project.
922
 The court noted that the statute’s 
language is so clear that it is unsusceptible to any other interpretation, even though the 
legislature arguably intended the statute to apply more broadly.
923
 Affirming, the supreme 
court held that a non-construction, owner-controlled insurance program is not barred by 
AS 21.36.065.
924
 
 
Whitney v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. 
In Whitney v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.,
925
 the supreme court held that an 
insurance company does not breach its duty of care toward a policy holder by declining 
to settle a lawsuit against him for more than the upper limit covered by his policy.
926
 
Whitney injured Giannechini in a traffic accident.
927
 Giannechini offered to settle all 
claims; Whitney’s insurer, State Farm, responded that it would be willing to settle for the 
maximum amount covered by Whitney’s policy.928 Giannechini refused and sued.929 
Whitney later sued State Farm, alleging that it had acted in bad faith and violated the duty 
of care owed to him by failing to settle.
930
 The trial court entered summary judgment in 
favor of State Farm.
931
 On appeal, the supreme court noted that all insurance contracts 
contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, including a duty to accept 
reasonable offers of settlement promptly.
932
 Here, that duty was not triggered because 
Giannechini’s settlement offer was higher than the policy limit.933 Affirming, the 
supreme court held that an insurance company does not breach its duty of care toward a 
policy holder by declining to settle a lawsuit against him for more than the upper limit 
covered by his policy.
934
 
 
NATIVE LAW 
top  
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
Blatchford v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium 
In Blatchford v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium,
935
 the Ninth Circuit held that 
the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA) provides a tribal organization with a 
right of recovery for health care services only against third parties and not against the 
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health care recipient.
936
 Blatchford was injured in a car accident and received free health 
care services from the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium (ANTHC).
937
 ANTHC 
filed a lien against Blatchford for any money that she might receive from third parties 
related to the injuries for which ANTHC had treated her.
938
 Blatchford then received a 
settlement from her insurer and sought a declaratory judgment that the ANTHC’s liens 
were not valid under IHCIA; ANTHC filed a counterclaim for payment of the money 
Blatchford had received.
939
 The district court granted summary judgment to ANTHC.
940
 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the title of the Act’s applicable section reads: 
“[r]eimbursement from certain third parties of costs and health services.”941 That section 
also contained another phrase implying that the statute only permits the health care 
provider to stand in the shoes of the health care recipient.
942
 The court reasoned that 
Congress enacted the statute to permit recovery from third parties because health care 
recipients would not be strongly inclined to seek remuneration for health care costs that 
were obtained for free.
943
 Reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that IHCIA provides a tribal 
organization with a right of recovery for health care services only against third parties 
and not against the health care recipient.
944
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village 
In McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village,
945
 the supreme court reaffirmed its previous decision 
that Alaska Native Tribes on the Department of the Interior’s list of federally recognized 
tribes are sovereign entities.
946
 Ivanof Bay Village contracted with McCrary to oversee its 
economic planning and development.
947
 When Ivanof Bay refused to pay expenses 
McCrary had incurred as part of the contract, McCrary sued.
948
 The superior court 
dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the tribe was 
federally recognized and thus protected by sovereign immunity.
949
 On appeal, McCrary 
argued that, although John v. Baker
950
 held that Alaska Native Tribes on the Department 
of the Interior’s list of federally recognized tribes are sovereign entities, the supreme 
court’s holding in that case should have no precedential value because no party in John v. 
Baker had argued against the position taken by the court.
951
 The court noted that its 
previous decision had been well-reasoned and, further, that it had never been called into 
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question by commentators, by Congress, or by other courts.
952
 The supreme court 
reaffirmed its previous decision that Alaska Native Tribes on the Department of the 
Interior’s list of federally recognized tribes are sovereign entities.953 
 
State v. Native Village of Tanana 
In State v. Native Village of Tanana,
954
 the supreme court held that federally recognized 
Alaska Native tribes that have not reassumed exclusive jurisdiction over child custody 
proceedings under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) still have concurrent 
jurisdiction to initiate child custody proceedings both inside and outside of Indian 
country.
955
 The State Attorney General issued an opinion stating that Alaska state courts 
had exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving Alaska Native 
children unless the child’s tribe successfully petitioned the Department of Interior for 
jurisdiction under ICWA or a state superior court transferred the case to a tribal court.
956
 
The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) then created guidelines severely limiting the 
amount of information it would give to a tribe about any investigations conducted by 
OCS, and the Bureau of Vital Statistics began refusing to accept tribal court adoption 
paperwork.
957
 Several tribes sought a declaratory judgment that they had inherent and 
concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate children’s proceedings.958 The superior court granted 
the tribes’ requested relief; the State appealed, arguing that ICWA provided a complete 
jurisdictional scheme limiting the ability of the tribes to initiate child custody 
proceedings.
959
 Four considerations led the court to believe that the tribes have 
concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody matters:  (1) a federally recognized 
tribe has inherent authority to regulate internal domestic relations unless Congress has 
divested it of that authority; (2) the elimination of nearly all Indian country under the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act did not divest the tribes of their authority to 
regulate internal domestic relations; (3) ambiguities in statutes affecting the rights of 
Native Americans must be resolved in favor of the Native Americans; (4) in enacting 
ICWA, Congress intended to allow tribes to adjudicate child custody matters.
960
 
Affirming, the supreme court held that federally recognized Alaska Native tribes that 
have not reassumed exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings under ICWA 
still have concurrent jurisdiction to initiate child custody proceedings both inside and 
outside of Indian country.
961
 
 
Bruce L. v. W.E. 
In Bruce L. v. W.E.,
962
 the supreme court held that a father can sufficiently acknowledge 
paternity of his son to qualify as a parent under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 
                                                 
952
 Id. at 340–41. 
953
 Id. at 342. 
954
 249 P.3d 734 (Alaska 2011). 
955
 Id. at 751. 
956
 Id. at 746. 
957
 Id. at 747. 
958
 Id. at 736. 
959
 Id. at 737. 
960
 Id. at 750. 
961
 Id. at 751. 
962
 247 P.3d 966 (Alaska 2011).  
67 
 
even if the father does not comply with the Alaska legitimation statute.
963
 The superior 
court upheld an adoption decree and termination of Bruce’s parental rights after he failed 
to establish paternity within one year of his child’s birth in accordance with state law.964 
On appeal, Bruce argued that since his son is an Indian child, termination of parental 
rights was subject to the higher ICWA evidentiary standard rather than the state law 
standard.
965
 The prospective adoptive parents argued that Bruce’s unwed status, in 
conjunction with his delay in establishing paternity, precluded ICWA’s application.966 
The court noted that Bruce had filed an acknowledgment of paternity with the superior 
court in the first adoption proceeding, that he had moved for custody and paternity 
testing, and that he had filed a separate suit for custody of his son.
967
 The supreme court 
vacated the trial court’s termination of Bruce’s parental rights and held that a father can 
sufficiently acknowledge paternity of his son to qualify as a parent under ICWA even if 
he does not comply with the Alaska legitimation statute.
968
 
 
Pravat P. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Pravat P. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
969
 the supreme court held 
that, to satisfy the “active efforts” requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 
the efforts of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) must cross the threshold from 
passive to active, and a parent’s lack of cooperation can excuse minor faults on the part 
of OCS.
970
 While Pravat was incarcerated for assaulting the mother of one of his children, 
OCS contacted him but did not start a case plan because Pravat, who was Laotian, spoke 
limited English and had bilateral hearing loss.
971
 OCS supervised meetings between 
Pravat and his children but delayed reunification efforts until Pravat could obtain a 
psychological assessment (which took over a year due to Pravat’s language and hearing 
issues).
972
 OCS obtained an interpreter for family therapy meetings, obtained a hearing 
aid for Pravat, and reached out to Laotian and Thai temples for assistance in teaching 
parenting skills to Pravat.
973
 Pravat was uncooperative with treatment and OCS moved to 
terminate his parental rights.
974
 In terminating Pravat’s parental rights, the superior court 
held that OCS had made “active efforts,” as required by ICWA, to prevent the breakup of 
Pravat’s family.975 On appeal, Pravat argued that OCS undermined his chances of 
reunification by failing to provide cultural continuity, failing to provide parenting 
modeling, and inappropriately delaying its efforts, thus violating its duty to make active 
efforts to prevent the breakup of his family.
976
 The supreme court noted that OCS is not 
required to be perfect to satisfy the “active efforts” requirement of ICWA; OCS’s efforts 
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merely need to cross the threshold from passive to active.
977
 Further, the court noted, a 
parent’s lack of cooperation can excuse minor faults on OCS’s part.978 Affirming, the 
supreme court held that, to satisfy the “active efforts” requirement of ICWA, OCS’s 
efforts must cross the threshold from passive to active, and a parent’s lack of cooperation 
can excuse minor faults on the part of OCS.
979
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Horan v. Kenai Peninsula Borough Board of Equalization 
In Horan v. Kenai Peninsula Borough Board of Equalization,
980
 the supreme court held 
that a Board of Equalization could consider rental restrictions when valuing low-income 
housing complexes for the purpose of assessing property taxes.
981
 Park Place owned an 
apartment complex built in 2004 that participated in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) program; the complex was valued by an independent appraiser at $652,000 
using an income approach.
982
 The Borough Assessor valued the complex at $2,930,700 
using a cost approach.
983
 Pacific Park appealed the Assessor’s valuation; the Board 
determined that although the Assessor had discretion to use the cost approach, rental 
restrictions should have been considered.
984
 In the supreme court, the Assessor argued 
that after AS 29.45.110(d) (which mandated an income-approach valuation for complexes 
qualifying for the LIHTC program before January 2001) became effective, rental 
restrictions could not be considered in the valuation of properties that qualified for the 
LIHTC program after January 2001.
985
 The supreme court disagreed, stating that a taxing 
authority is not prohibited from considering rental restrictions just because it is not 
required to use an income approach to property valuation.
986
 Thus, the supreme court 
determined, it was reasonable for the Board to consider the rental restrictions on Pacific 
Park’s apartment complex in its valuation.987 Affirming, the supreme court held that a 
Board of Equalization could consider rental restrictions when valuing low-income 
housing complexes for the purpose of assessing property taxes.
988
 
 
Varilek v. Burke 
In Varilek v. Burke,
989
 the supreme court held that a Board of Equalization is not required 
to use a previous valuation of property as the starting point for determining the property’s 
                                                 
977
 Id. 
978
 Id. 
979
 Id. 
980
 247 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2011). 
981
 Id. at 998. 
982
 Id. at 996. 
983
 Id. 
984
 Id. at 997. 
985
 Id. at 998. 
986
 Id. 
987
 Id. 
988
 Id.  
989
 254 P.3d 1068 (Alaska 2011). 
69 
 
current valuation.
990
 In 2006, the Board of Equalization assessed the value of Varilek’s 
property at $85,000.
991
 Two years later, its value was reassessed at $146,200.
992
 Varilek 
appealed the reassessment; the lower court held that Varilek had not shown that the 
property had been improperly valued.
 993
 On appeal, Varilek argued that the Board should 
have considered the 2006 tax assessment as the base rate when it valued the property in 
2008 and that the Board should have been required to explain the difference between the 
assessments.
994
 The supreme court reasoned that property assessments are based on 
current market values, not previously assessed values; Varilek thus had the burden of 
proving that the 2008 assessment was incorrect.
995
 The supreme court held that a Board 
of Equalization is not required to use a previous valuation of property as the starting point 
for determining the property’s current valuation.996 
 
Stevens v. Stevens 
In Stevens v. Stevens,
997
 the supreme court held that it is an abuse of discretion to divide 
marital property according to its value at a time before the final property division if the 
property’s value has changed significantly in the interim.998 Mr. and Mrs. Stevens 
separated in 2006 and their divorce proceedings went to trial in June 2007.
999
 After the 
first day of trial, the two parties believed they had reached a settlement agreement.
1000
 
But the two were unable to memorialize the terms of the agreement and their case went 
back to trial in August 2008.
1001
 After the new trial, the superior court divided the marital 
assets based on their value as of the first trial date in 2007.
1002
 The supreme court noted 
that, with a few exceptions, property should be divided according to its value close to the 
time that the court actually divides the property.
1003
  Moreover, the court reasoned that it 
would be inequitable to divide their property according to its value at the earlier date 
because the value of their assets had changed by more than 15 percent during the year 
that separated the two trials.
1004
 Reversing, the supreme court held that it is an abuse of 
discretion to divide marital property by its value at a time before the final property 
division if the property’s value has changed significantly in the interim.1005 
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Burts v. Burts 
In Burts v. Burts,
1006
 the supreme court held that federal law does not preempt the states 
from treating military health insurance benefits as marital assets to be divided in a 
divorce.
1007
 Leon received TRICARE health insurance as a military retiree.
1008
 When he 
and his wife divorced, the superior court treated his health insurance as a marital asset 
and divided its value between the two.
1009
 Leon appealed, arguing that state courts are 
preempted from considering TRICARE in marital property divisions.
1010
 The supreme 
court first noted that field preemption did not apply, because the Former Spouses’ 
Protection Act permits state courts to treat disposable retired pay as either belonging 
solely to the military retiree or to the married couple.
1011
 The court next reasoned that 
conflict preemption did not apply because TRICARE benefits more closely resemble 
pension benefits that can be characterized as marital property (such as disposable retired 
pay) than those benefits that cannot (such as military disability retired pay). Affirming, 
the supreme court held that federal law does not preempt the states from treating military 
health insurance benefits as marital assets to be divided in a divorce.
1012
 
 
Price v. Eastham 
In Price v. Eastham,
1013
 the supreme court held that prescriptive easements are limited to 
those users who have satisfied the elements of the prescriptive easement statute and does 
not extend to other types of users.
1014
 Price owned land that was used by snowmachiners, 
for whom a public prescriptive easement over the land was established.
1015
 In defining the 
scope of the easement, the superior court held that other uses, such as hiking, dog-
sledding, and hunting, should be included in the easement.
1016
 The supreme court 
reasoned that a prescriptive easement is limited to only those users and those uses that 
satisfy the elements of the prescriptive easement.
1017
 Because the superior court had not 
explicitly found that non-snowmachine users had satisfied the elements of a prescriptive 
easement, they could not be included in the easement.
1018
 Reversing, the supreme court 
held that prescriptive easements are limited to those users who have satisfied the 
elements of the prescriptive easement statute and does not extend to other types of 
users.
1019
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Gillis v. Aleutians East Borough 
In Gillis v. Aleutians East Borough,
1020
 the supreme court held that, to qualify for a 
purchase preference under the Alaska Land Act, a lessee must enter the land while it is 
under federal control.
1021
 In 1989, Gillis leased five acres of state land from the Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR).
1022
 DNR then conveyed the land and lease 
interest to Aleutians East Borough.
1023
 Gillis offered to buy the land from the Borough; 
when the Borough refused, he asserted a right to purchase the land under the Alaska Land 
Act.
1024
 The superior court granted summary judgment to the Borough.
1025
 On appeal, the 
supreme court reasoned that the Alaska Land Act’s plain language requires an individual 
to enter the land while it is still under federal ownership to qualify for a purchase 
preference.
1026
 Although the statute gives some government land users a right to purchase 
leased land without competitive bidding, to qualify the user must begin use of the land 
while it is under federal ownership.
1027
 Affirming, the supreme court held that, to qualify 
for a purchase preference under the Alaska Land Act, a lessee must enter the land while it 
is under federal control.
1028
 
 
Shaffer v. Bellows 
In Shaffer v. Bellows,
1029
 the supreme court held that a fixed price repurchase option of 
unlimited duration may be an unreasonable restraint on transfers of real property.
1030
 
Shaffer and Bellows purchased an island near Sitka.
1031
 Shaffer later quitclaimed his 
interest in the property in exchange for money and an option agreement that stated he 
would have an option to buy the island at a fixed price should Bellows ever sell.
1032
 
When Bellows later gifted the property, Shaffer sued under the agreement.
1033
 The lower 
court held that the option agreement ran with the land and was still viable.
1034
 On appeal, 
the supreme court remanded the case for a determination of whether the option agreement 
was unenforceable.
1035
 The supreme court noted that a fixed price repurchase option of 
unlimited duration is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
1036
 The court reasoned that 
such a restraint would leave owners with an incentive not to sell, even if a potential buyer 
would pay more and be willing to put the property to more beneficial use.
1037
 Remanding, 
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the supreme court held that a fixed price repurchase option of unlimited duration may be 
an unreasonable restraint on transfers of real property.
1038
  
 
Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc. 
In Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc.,
1039
 the supreme court held that a commercial tenant does 
not necessarily waive its right to rent abatement, if the tenant has signed a contract with a 
strict non-waiver provision and if the landlord does not suffer prejudice, even if the 
tenant fails to pay rent for six weeks and does not discuss rent abatement with its 
landlord.
1040
  CMS entered into a long-term lease for a commercial storefront with 
Sengul.
1041
  The lease included a provision that abated the rent by three to four days for 
every day the property was delivered late to lessee.
1042
  The lease also included a non-
waiver provision, which stated that a failure by either party to insist upon a contractual 
right would not constitute waiver of that right.
1043
  Sengul delivered the property to CMS 
a week late because defects in the storefront had to be remedied first.
1044
  After moving 
in, CMS did not pay rent to Sengul and failed to mention rent abatement until six weeks 
had passed.
1045
  The superior court held that CMS had waived its right to abatement 
because it had declined to timely invoke the lease’s rent abatement provision.1046  The 
supreme court disagreed, first noting the strict non-waiver provision in the contract.
1047
 
The court then noted that CMS could have explicitly or implicitly waived its right to 
abatement but that CMS had done neither.
1048
 CMS could not have impliedly waived its 
right to abatement because its failure to raise the issue had not prejudiced Sengul at all—
even if the issue had been raised before CMS moved into the storefront, Sengul could not 
have more quickly remedied the defects that pushed back the move-in date.
1049
 
Reversing, the supreme court held that a commercial tenant does not necessarily waive its 
right to rent abatement, if the tenant has signed a contract with a strict non-waiver 
provision and if the owner does not suffer prejudice, even if the tenant fails to pay rent 
for six weeks without discussing rent abatement with its landlord.
1050
   
 
Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough 
In Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough,
1051
 the supreme court held that, when a 
charitable organization leases property to a charitable organization that uses the property 
exclusively for charitable purposes, the revenue remains tax-exempt regardless of the 
amount of money earned from the lease.
1052
 Henash sought tax-exempt status for two 
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parcels of land that it had leased to charitable organizations; the borough’s tax assessor 
denied the request because Henash had leased the property at market rates.
1053
 The 
superior court affirmed.
1054
 On appeal, the supreme court determined that, under           
AS 29.45.030 (which governs the tax-exempt status of charitable organizations), the 
amount of money received by the lessor is immaterial to determining the tax-exempt 
status of the leased property.
1055
  Because Henash, a charitable organization, had leased 
its property to a charitable organization that used the property exclusively for charitable 
purposes, the property was tax-exempt under the statute.
1056
  Reversing, the supreme 
court held that, when a charitable organization leases property to a charitable 
organization that uses the property exclusively for charitable purposes, the revenue 
remains tax-exempt regardless of the amount of money earned from the lease.
1057
 
 
Cowan v. Yeisley 
In Cowan v. Yeisley,
1058
 the supreme court held that (1) a deeded right of way grants an 
easement, not full title, to the recipient
1059
 and (2) AS 09.10.030, Alaska’s most recent 
adverse-possession statute, does not apply retroactively.
1060
 In 1956, Cowan was deeded 
land and a “perpetual right of way running with the land” over a 30-foot strip alongside 
the tract.
1061
 In the years that followed, plots of land around Cowan were conveyed and 
subdivided.
1062
 The subdivision’s plat showed Cowan’s right of way and dedicated it to 
the local borough.
1063
 Cowan sued to determine who controlled the right of way.
1064
 The 
superior court ruled that the original deed had not conveyed the disputed land and, using 
the most recent adverse-possession statute, denied Cowan’s adverse-possession claim.1065 
The supreme court reasoned that the original deed had not conveyed the disputed strip of 
land because the “right of way” language unambiguously granted an easement, not full 
title.
1066
 With respect to the adverse-possession claim, the supreme court noted that no 
statute applies retroactively unless the legislature explicitly makes it retroactive.
1067
 
Because Cowan’s potential adverse possession occurred and would have been completed 
before the most recent statute was enacted, the most recent statute did not apply.
1068
  The 
supreme court held that (1) a deeded right of way grants an easement, not full title, to the 
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recipient
1069
 and (2) AS 09.10.030, Alaska’s most recent adverse-possession statute, does 
not apply retroactively.
1070
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
Jachetta v. United States, Bureau of Land Management 
In Jachetta v. United States, Bureau of Land Management,
1071
 the Ninth Circuit held that 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) may provide a waiver of federal sovereign 
immunity when the alleged torts are also actionable under state law.
1072
 Jachetta, an 
Alaska Native, applied in 1971 to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for a Native 
allotment comprised of two land parcels.
1073
 Due to an error by BIA, in 1986 the Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM) issued only the first parcel.
1074
 Meanwhile, BLM granted 
permits to third parties to use the second parcel for the extraction of over 700,000 cubic 
yards of gravel, leaving a giant crater on the property.
1075
 After years of administrative 
proceedings, Jachetta finally received the second parcel in 2004.
1076
 Jachetta sued BLM 
and the State for damages and injunctive relief.
1077
 The district court dimissed Jachetta’s 
claims, holding that BLM and the State had sovereign immunity and had not waived 
it.
1078
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the Eleventh Amendment barred the 
entirety of Jachetta’s claims against the State.1079 The court reasoned, however, that the 
FTCA provided a waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity for Jachetta’s 
nuisance and breach-of-fiduciary-duties claims against BLM because they are actionable 
torts under Alaska state law.
1080
 Reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the FTCA may 
provide a waiver of federal sovereign immunity when the alleged torts are actionable 
under state law.
1081
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage,
1082
 the supreme court held that the Workers’ 
Compensation Act shields a municipality from lawsuits regarding work-related 
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injuries.
1083
 Nelson was injured in a workplace accident and sued the municipality for 
damages.
1084
 The superior court granted summary judgment to the municipality because it 
qualified as a “project owner” under AS 23.30.045(a) and, therefore, the Workers’ 
Compensation Act shielded the municipality from torts arising from work-related 
injuries.
1085
 On appeal, Nelson argued that, under AS 23.30.045, the municipality should 
be classified as a “contract-awarding entity” and not as a “project owner.”1086 If the court 
accepted his argument, the Workers’ Compensation Act would not shield the 
municipality from liability.
1087
 The supreme court first noted that the statute’s definition 
of “project owner” did not preclude the municipality from being characterized as a 
project owner.
1088
 Further, the legislative history strongly suggested that the legislature 
had intended to include the State and its political subdivisions in its definition of “project 
owner.”1089 Accordingly, the supreme court held that the Workers’ Compensation Act 
shields a municipality from lawsuits regarding work-related injuries.
1090
 
 
Olson v. City of Hooper Bay 
In Olson v. City of Hooper Bay,
1091
 the supreme court held that:  (1) internal police 
department regulations regarding taser usage can serve as notice that excessive tasing 
represents excessive force and (2) the very nature of an officer’s actions may provide 
enough notice that his amount of force is excessive.
1092
 Olson was physically and 
verbally combative with officers when they entered his home.
1093
 The officers tased him 
at least 15 times within one minute; some of the tasings occurred while Olson was 
handcuffed and lying face-down.
1094
 The superior court held that the officers were 
immune to Olson’s civil lawsuit because Fourth Amendment taser jurisprudence was not 
clear enough to provide adequate notice to the officers that multiple tasings constituted 
excessive force.
1095
 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that internal police 
department regulations could have provided notice because they established an 
unconstested standard for taser usage and because they were not in conflict with federal 
guidelines for taser usage.
1096
 Additionally, the supreme court reasoned that the very 
nature of the officers’ actions could have provided notice that they were using excessive 
force.
1097
 The supreme court reversed and held that:  (1) internal police department 
regulations regarding taser usage can serve as notice that excessive tasing represents 
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excessive force and (2) the very nature of an officer’s actions may provide enough notice 
that his amount of force is excessive.
1098
 
 
Russell ex rel. J.N. v. Virg-In 
In Russell ex rel. J.N. v. Virg-In,
1099
 the supreme court held that any reasonable officer 
would believe that it is excessive to tase an 11 year-old girl twice after she has committed 
a misdemeanor traffic violation and has been compliant in her arrest.
1100
 J.N. ran several 
stop signs while driving her ATV at 35 m.p.h.
1101
 Virg-In, a police officer, turned on his 
lights and siren and followed J.N.
1102
 J.N. nearly ran into Virg-In’s car; when she tried to 
get away, her ATV stalled.
1103
 Virg-In approached her, tased her twice, then arrested 
her.
1104
 J.N.’s mother sued Virg-In for excessive use of force.1105 The superior court 
granted summary judgment, determining that Virg-In was entitled to qualified immunity 
because no clearly-established law would have put him on notice that his conduct was 
unlawful and because his conduct was not so extreme that any reasonable officer would 
have known it was excessive.
1106
 On appeal, the supreme court noted that some conduct 
can be so egregious that any reasonable officer would know that it is unlawful.
1107
 The 
court reasoned that the use of force is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants 
who are not fleeing, resisting arrest, or posing an immediate threat to an officer’s 
safety.
1108
 Because the superior court had not made any factual findings on these issues, a 
remand was necessary.
1109
 The supreme court held that any reasonable officer would 
believe that it is excessive to tase an 11 year-old girl twice after she has committed a 
misdemeanor traffic violation and has been compliant in her arrest.
1110
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Foster v. Professional Guardian Services Corp. 
In Foster v. Professional Guardian Services Corp.,
1111
 the supreme court held that, under 
the “reasonable compensation” standard of AS 13.26.230, a conservator may not obtain 
reimbursement from an estate for attorneys’ fees spent in the unsuccessful defense of 
conservator actions that caused significant harm to the estate.
1112
 The superior court 
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appointed a professional conservator for a woman suffering from dementia.
1113
 Her 
daughter sued the conservator and it was found that the conservator had breached its 
fiduciary duty to the estate.
1114
 The conservator incurred large legal fees, paid by the 
estate, in defending its actions.
1115
 The superior court approved reimbursement from the 
mother’s property for the full attorneys’ fees the conservator incurred because               
AS 13.26.230 permits reasonable compensation from an estate to its lawyers or 
conservators.
1116
 On appeal, the supreme court noted that the paramount interest of       
AS 13.26.230 is the protection of the incapacitated person’s estate.1117 The court reasoned 
that it would be unreasonable and impermissible under AS 13.26.230 to require a 
protected person to fund a conservator’s legal defense of actions that had significantly 
damaged the protected person’s estate, even if the defense was undertaken in good 
faith.
1118
 The supreme court held that under the “reasonable compensation” standard of 
AS 13.26.230, a conservator may not obtain reimbursement from an estate for attorneys’ 
fees spent in the unsuccessful defense of conservator actions that caused significant harm 
to the estate.
1119
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